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This thesis is concerned with investigating two phenomena related to civil society 
occurring in competitive authoritarian regimes: Closing space for civil society and 
deliberation in the form of limited pluralism. The study explores how Russian human rights 
NGOs perceive this mix and how they respond. While some level of pluralism in civil society 
is assumed to be necessary in order to cope with the institutional uncertainties that 
competitive authoritarian regimes experience, closing the space for civil society is equally 
called for in order to ensure the survival of a regime that is neither entirely democratic nor 
completely authoritarian. How do NGOs respond to the resulting dual framework? 
 Although Russian human rights NGOs have been the targets of increasingly 
restrictive measures over the last fifteen years, they have nevertheless also been invited to 
take part in an increasing number of bodies tasked with consulting and monitoring. The thesis 
answers the research question: In what ways do Russian human rights NGOs respond to new 
restrictions, and why and how do they participate in co-optation efforts from the state? 
Twelve semistructured interviews have been conducted with the goal of contributing 
with new knowledge about what strategies NGOs develop to succeed in closing space.  The 
thesis looks at new and less formal organizational forms, funding opportunities and prospects 
of building domestic support. It discusses what benefits NGOs gain from participating in 
consultative- and monitoring bodies and issues related to legitimacy with regard to 
participating. 
 
Key words: Closing space for civil society, limited pluralism, authoritarian deliberation, civil 
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The assumption that the existence of strong civil societies is central in establishing robust 
consolidated democracies has for several decades motivated Western support to civil society 
in states transitioning to democracy. In the early-mid 2000s, it became clear that many of the 
governments that were at the receiving end of democracy-building programs were beginning 
to crack down on programs targeting civil society on their territory (Carothers 2006). 
Enthusiasm for the role of civil society in hybrid regimes has since been replaced by worries. 
The last fifteen years, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in competitive authoritarian 
regimes all over the world have experienced a rush of laws designed to curb their 
opportunities – the space for civic activism is shrinking (Dupuy, Ron et al. 2016). 
While civil society always has been in a vulnerable position in authoritarian settings and 
has experienced severe restrictions throughout history, what is new now are the tools that 
have been introduced to control it (Sikkink 2018: 175).  Among the most common and 
globally used strategies for diminishing the political opportunity structures for NGOs are 
delegitimization, sweeping legislative measures, selective targeting, and creating alternative 
civic actors (Brechenmacher 2017: 90-97). However, restrictions are not the only thing NGOs 
in authoritarian settings find themselves adjusting to. As competitive authoritarian regimes 
put restrictions on NGOs, they also develop new opportunities to participate in deliberation 
that enable them to enjoy certain benefits (Owen 2017).  
We know that space is closing, but what we know far less about is how NGOs in 
competitive authoritarian regimes perceive and respond to this new landscape. Therefore, this 
thesis will through the use of qualitative interviews with affected NGOs seek to explore the 
case of Russia and how Russian human rights NGOs adapt to “the new normal”.  
1.1 The puzzle: Opportunities in closing space 
On one hand, states can perceive forces within civil society as threatening to its interests, 
and hence have reason to place restrictions on NGOs, in particular with regard to taking part 
in transnational activism. This is especially the case with human rights NGOs, whose work 
often target the state directly. On the other hand, vibrant civil societies are beneficial for the 
state, as it amongst other things eases the interaction between ordinary citizens and the state – 
thereby facilitating good governance. Competitive authoritarian regimes therefore have reason 
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to develop institutional frameworks where they can enjoy these benefits. When NGOs voice 
their issues within the institutional framework, this may – intentionally or not - function as a 
feedback mechanism, thereby actually contributing to the sustainability of authoritarianism 
(Giersdorf and Croissant 2011: 15).  
This thesis will look at how Russian human rights NGOs experience the dual, and at times 
conflicting, goals of the government towards civil society. How do they respond to the mix of 
administrative restrictions and new venues to voice issues – do they incentivize new forms of 
behavior? By answering this, the thesis seeks to contribute to the literature that strives to 
unravel the puzzle of Russia’s seemingly inconsistent policies concerning the non-profit 
sector. More specifically, this thesis aims to shed light on how the NGOs themselves perceive 
these puzzling policies. 
While putting up legislative, economic and rhetoric barriers against human rights NGOs 
certainly make their work more challenging, the same constraints can also create opportunities 
for innovation of new strategies (Van Der Vet and Lyytikäinen 2015: 980, Rodríguez-
Garavito and Gomez 2018: 34). When some doors close, NGOs are forced to start looking for 
opportunities that have been less explored earlier. For example, as hindering foreign meddling 
has been a central theme for competitive authoritarian regimes, this calls for exploring the 
extent to which seeking to develop stronger support at the domestic level is a useful strategy 
for affected NGOs. 
Legitimation strategies involving civil society actors used by competitive authoritarian 
regimes have been portrayed as playing a role in authoritarian regime resilience (Lorch and 
Bunk 2017). Therefore, it is of interest to map out how the NGOs respond in order to evaluate 
the effects of the new restrictions and opportunities. Do restrictions actually lead to the 
intended outcome – pacifying the critical parts of civil society -  and what are the implications 
of restrictions on NGOs for the role that civil society plays in democratic consolidation? Can 
civil society under competitive authoritarian rule contribute to prevent a state from going 
further down the authoritarian path, or does the existence of a civil society rather enhance the 
stability of the authoritarian order? 
1.2 Russia as a trendsetter in closing civic space 
Putin’s Russia is one of the most distinct examples of the closing space-trend, and has 
been a trendsetter for other competitive authoritarian regimes on such a scale that the closing 
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space for civil society today reaches far outside the post-soviet states and should be 
understood as the “new normal” rather than a temporary deviation (Carothers 2016). 
Restrictions targeting civil society have been implemented in two waves in modern 
Russia. The first round occurred around 2006, following several color revolutions in 
neighboring states where domestic civil society forces with foreign economic and financial 
support played a central role in overthrowing the authoritarian regimes (Van Der Vet and 
Lyytikäinen 2015: 981). The first wave happened at a time when the war on terror was in 
focus, and restrictions on civil society were justified by the state as protection against future 
attacks. In the Russian case the restrictions came about after the Beslan school hostage attack 
(Richter 2009b: 39). This combination of events motivated the implementation of laws that 
regulated NGOs in Russia, including vague anti-extremism legislation and restrictions on 
foreign funding (Van Der Vet and Lyytikäinen 2015: 981). 
The second wave of restrictions followed when Putin was reelected in 2012, and the 
foreign agent-law has been central here. Any Russian NGO that receives foreign funding and 
takes part in political activity can in principle be labeled as a foreign agent. The foreign agent 
NGOs are required to submit reports to the Ministry of Justice concerning their finances and 
activities far more often than ordinary NGOs, thereby burdening them with time and resource 
consuming tasks (Flikke 2016: 103). NGOs that fail to register face penalties such as heavy 
fines. In addition, NGOs shun the label because it puts them in a bad light and makes finding 
partners to cooperate with harder.  
During the same period, NGOs in Russia have been the focus of co-optation efforts 
from the government, which have provided them with new opportunities. This occurs on 
several levels. Financially, new grants systems for NGOs have been developed and the 
amount available to apply for has increased (USAID 2017: 203).  On the organizational level, 
the government has taken initiative to replace foreign democracy assistance-programs’ role, 
thus spreading the know-how of how to run successful NGOs through training programs. 
Finally, a range of different consultative mechanisms and control organs that make use of 
civil society have been developed. The growth and use of these structures “signal a concern 
with deeper integration between authorities and citizens” (Stuvøy 2013: 377). In this thesis, 
human rights NGOs’ use of and representation in three different examples of such structures 
will be looked closer at. These are:  
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• The Civic Chambers (obshchestvennye palaty). On federal and regional level. 
Consists of civil society representatives. Channel issues, give advice on draft 
laws. 
• Prison observer commissions (obshchestvennye nablyudatelnye komissii, from 
here on referred to as ONK). Members are granted the right to enter prison and 
detention facilities to control human rights conditions. 
• The Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (from here 
referred to as PCHRCS). Advices the President of the Russian Federation. 
 
1.3 The research question and why it is relevant to do research on NGOs’ 
perceptions of closing space for civil society in competitive authoritarian 
regimes 
The research question is attentive to both sides of the puzzle sketched out above – it 
takes into consideration that NGOs need to respond to both opportunities taken away from 
them as well as responding to new opportunities granted to them in the form of invitations to 
cooperation from the state. The thesis asks the following question: 
In what ways do Russian human rights NGOs respond to new restrictions, and why and how 
do they participate in co-optation efforts from the state? 
Researchers in political science have addressed the closing of civic space by focusing on 
why the phenomenon occurs (Mendelson 2015), by investigating the strategies used by 
authoritarian governments to limit mobilization and by exploring the prevalence of these 
tactics (Christensen and Weinstein 2013, Dupuy, Ron et al. 2016).  Other influential 
contributions have focused on how the international community and donors have responded to 
the pushback (Gershman and Allen 2006, Carothers 2016).  
However, less has been said about how the affected NGOs in turn work out rational 
responses to cope and achieve their goals in a changing and increasingly challenging 
environment. How do they play their cards when the rules of the game have been changed? 
This thesis argues that understanding the resulting game not only depends on looking at the 
cards that have been taken out of the deck (restrictions), but also on understanding the use of 
the new cards that have been introduced (inclusion in deliberation). This is where the second 
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part of the research question comes in: Why and how do Russian human rights NGOs 
participate in co-optation efforts from the state? 
Little is known about the emerging patterns of responses from NGOs to closing civic 
space and to what degree they are successful. It is to this understudied field that this thesis 
aims to contribute by bringing in fresh data gathered from interviews with respondents who 
work in NGOs that are affected by “the new normal”.  
By evaluating in what ways and how successful NGOs are at navigating in waters 
were the rules of the game have been changed, the discussion will also contribute by saying 
something about to what degree the restrictive measures work as intended. Although this is 
not the main goal of the thesis, the answers provided by my respondents provide new data that 
have value as a useful indication on the success rate of the most common tools used by 
competitive authoritarian regimes to control civil society.  
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter two will conceptualize key terms and serve to anchor the research question in 
existing literature. By connecting literature on the most common strategies for controlling 
civil society in competitive authoritarian regimes with emerging literature and reports on how 
NGOs respond, five hypotheses are developed. The hypotheses are assumptions regarding 
what tactics NGOs will work out when responding to different situations of closing and 
opening space. 
Next, chapter three will justify choice of research design and defend why it is 
necessary to conduct interviews in order to answer the research question in a good manner. I 
discuss challenges related to doing fieldwork on sensitive issues in a semi-authoritarian 
setting. 
Chapter four provides the reader with necessary background knowledge. I look back 
on the implications of a post-communist totalitarian legacy and describe the development of 
the regulatory framework governing NGOs in Russia from Yeltsin’s presidency up until 
today. Special emphasis is given to the foreign agent law. I describe the three consultative and 
control organs that are most relevant for human rights NGOs to participate in. 
Chapter five will answer the research question by reviewing the five hypotheses 
presented in chapter two. I analyze the ways in which the NGOs have experimented with new 
organizational forms, how they have developed coalitions amongst them, attempts at building 
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local constituency, and the search for new funding models. I look at how they participate in 
government-initiated structures and the reasons they state for participating.  
Finally, chapter six summarizes the findings. I account for limitations and give 
suggestions for further research on closing space for civil society and authoritarian 





2 Theory and Concepts 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will define central concepts that are used in the thesis as well as outline 
important theoretical contributions. I will discuss Michael Walzer’s “civil society argument” 
and show that there is a paradox in it due to civil society’s role as both a complement to 
government and a counterweight to government, that can best be solved by dividing the civil 
society argument into parts. The civil society argument will serve as a frame for discussing 
central theory in the field. Summarized, the civil society argument claims that: 
A “dense network of civil associations” is said to promote the stability and 
effectiveness of the democratic polity through both the effects of association on 
citizens’ “habits of the heart” and the ability of associations to mobilize citizens on 
behalf of public causes (Foley and Edwards 1996: 38).  
This is inspired by Michael Foley and Bob Edwards’ “The Paradox of Civil Society” 
(1996), where the authors dissect Walzer’s argument into two broad versions: Civil Society I 
“puts special emphasis on the ability of associational life in general and the habits of 
association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic 
polity” (Foley and Edwards 1996: 39). Civil Society II, on the other hand, “lays special 
emphasis on civil society as a sphere of action that is independent of the state and that is 
capable - precisely for this reason – of energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime” (Foley 
and Edwards 1996: 39). The paradox is based on the contradictions inherent in the civil 
society argument: While Civil Society I frames the presence of a vibrant civil society as a 
source of stability in a state, Civil Society II frames it as a facilitator for destabilizing 
tyrannical states (Nickel 2012: 65). I will relate the arguments provided by Civil Society I and 
Civil Society II to relevant literature and will throughout the chapter be particularly attentive 
to how the two parts of the civil society argument provide different incentives for how 
competitive authoritarian regimes rationally seek to govern political opportunity structures for 
civil society.  
I will begin by conceptualizing civil society and NGOs and explain how these key 
terms are understood in this thesis. Then I will move on to explain what is meant by political 
opportunity structures, before I seek to justify why it is interesting to connect competitive 
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authoritarianism and civil society. Following that, I use contributions from theory to discuss 
ways in which NGOs can be beneficial to competitive authoritarian regimes as well as ways 
they can be problematic. This paves the way for discussing the phenomenon that is the main 
focus of this thesis: Closing space for civil society. The closing space-phenomenon is seen in 
connection with Western democracy building support to NGOs. Next, the concept of limited 
pluralism is introduced as a useful mechanism for hybrid regimes to manage civil society. 
Lastly, the most common strategies for controlling civil society in competitive authoritarian 
regimes are paired up with emerging literature and reports on how NGOs respond. Based on 
this, five hypotheses are developed concerning how NGOs will respond in closing space. 
2.2 Conceptualizing civil society and NGOs 
Civil society is a broad term that covers a wide variety of activities, that nonetheless are 
similar in that they take place outside the setting of the family, government, and business 
(Henderson 2003: 1). Diamond (1994: 5) defines civil society as “the realm of organized 
social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the 
state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. [it] involves citizens acting 
collectively in a public sphere”. By acknowledging that civil society operates under a set of 
rules, Diamond accepts that although civil society has to be autonomous from the state, it can 
never be completely sovereign. Henry and  McIntosh Sundstrom’s definition lack this aspect, 
but adds special emphasis to civil society as an arena for collective action: “We contend that 
civil society is a space of citizen-directed collective action, located between the family and the 
state, and not directed solely toward private profit” (Henry and  McIntosh Sundstrom quoted 
in Evans 2012: 233). The notion of “citizen-directed“ implies that the actors are voluntarily 
taking part in civil society. The uncoerced aspect is underlined in Walzer’s definition, which 
holds civil society to mean the “uncoerced human association and also the set of relational 
networks […] that fill this space.” (Walzer quoted in Henderson 2011: 12).  
Some authors include more normative elements in their civil society definitions. For 
example, Howard (2003: 41) holds that civil society consists of groups that “follow the 
general liberal democratic principles”. Introducing normative elements into the definition that 
suggest that civil society is inherently “good” and made up of groups with a particular set of 
values is not problematic because this diverges from real-world facts (Celichowsky 2004: 62). 
Although all the NGOs I investigate in this thesis can be said to “follow the general liberal 
democratic principles”, I argue that a civil society definition with less markedly normative 
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elements provides the most solid foundation for a better understanding of how civil society 
has developed in Russia and other post-communist states. 
One way of understanding civil society is in its very distance from the state. In “Modes of 
Civil Society”, Charles Taylor specifies three different “senses” of the concept of civil 
society, depending on how the state relates to civil society: 
1. “In a minimal sense, civil society exists where there are free associations, not under 
tutelage of state power. 
2. In a stronger sense, civil society exists only where society as a whole can structure 
itself and co-ordinate its actions through such associations which are free of state 
tutelage. 
3. As an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can speak of civil society 
wherever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course 
of state policy.” (Taylor 1990: 98) 
Taylor’s differentiation of senses civil society exist related to the state is useful to bear 
in mind when we embark upon examining the conditions for NGOs that are situated in a 
restrictive setting.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become a central part of the greater 
landscape of civil society. Salamon and Anheier (1998: 216) identify a group of defining 
features for the entities that make up the non-profit sector. Firstly, they are organizations, 
meaning that they have an institutional manifestation and structure. Secondly, they are private 
and institutionally separate from the state. Thirdly, they are non-profit and do not work to 
increase profit for their managers. Next, they are in charge of themselves and in control of 
their own affairs. Finally, they are voluntary; in the sense that members have freely chosen to 
be part of the entity and that the organization attracts some level of voluntary contribution of 
time and/or money. These six features however fail to include what makes the NGO-form 
particularly vulnerable to oppression attempts from the state. As this thesis is concerned with 
explaining how NGOs respond to targeted oppression from the state, a conceptualization that 
stresses this important point shall be employed.   
A subset of civic organization, defined by the fact that they are formally registered 
with government, receive a significant proportion of their income from voluntary 
contributions (usually alongside grants from government), and are governed by a 
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board of trustees rather than the elected representatives of a constituency (Edwards 
quoted in Glasius and Ishkanian 2015: 2624).  
Edward’s definition will be used throughout this thesis, as it by emphasizing 
registration, income and way of governing in a clear manner allows for drawing the line 
between what constitutes an NGO compared to less formal movements on the one hand and 
business-like enterprises on the other hand. Having a clear understanding of what an NGO is 
will be important for the research question posed in this thesis, as I investigate how NGOs 
respond to changed opportunity structures. As shall be discussed, one way of responding can 
be to leave the NGO-form to the advantage of ways of structuring that falls outside of how 
NGOs function according to the three features stated in Edwards’ definition.  
2.3 Political opportunity structures  
As Diamond’s conceptualization of civil society suggested, NGOs as a part of civil 
society navigate within a framework of formal and informal boundaries. The state is the most 
important engineer in drawing these boundaries, as “it both frames civil society and occupies 
space within it. It fixes the boundary conditions and the basic rules of all associational activity 
(including political activity)” (Walzer 1991: 8). As discussed in the last paragraph, civil 
society is often conceptualized in terms of its relation to the state. Neocleous (1995: 397) goes 
deeper into the significance of this relationship when he proclaims that “to talk of civil society 
without the state is an absurdity. It is not just that there has to be some form of state through 
which 'collective' decisions are reached or contractual relations regulated. It is that civil 
society is actively shaped and ordered by the state”.  
Tarrow refers to what Walzer and Neocleous touch upon in the citations above as 
political opportunity structures. Political opportunity structures are “consistent – but not 
necessarily formal, permanent, or national – signals to social or political actors which either 
encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements” 
(Tarrow 2005: 23). Political opportunity structures are influenced by institutional factors and 
historical legacy, as well as the resources available (Kitschelt 1986: 58). Summed up, 
differences in these factors are crucial to explain differences in how costly it is to achieve 
change. Tarrow’s definition highlights an important point when specifying that the political 
opportunity structures not necessarily need to be the same within a nation (Kitschelt 1986: 
63). Different fields of Russian civil society will for example find themselves working under 
different political opportunity structures. While political opportunity structures do not alone 
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determine whether or not a movement will succeed, they are central in explaining how easy or 
hard it will be to make an impact as well as in understanding why it is rational for movements 
to pursue different strategies (Kitschelt 1986: 58).  
2.4 Authoritarianism with adjectives: Connecting competitive 
authoritarianism and civil society  
The final quarter of the twentieth century was marked by a diverse set of transitions 
from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the direction of liberal democracy - a 
development known as the third wave of democracy (Carothers 2006: 5). The end of the Cold 
War and the subsequent growth in number of regimes en route to democracy contributed to a 
wave of enthusiasm for civil society and its potential for helping to consolidate the newborn 
democracies (Howell, Ishkanian et al. 2008). Transition literature assumed that 
democratization would take place in stages, with an opening, a breakthrough, and finally 
consolidation (Sakwa 2011: 2).  Linz and Stepan assign civil society a key role in all stages, 
and argue that "a robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to 
monitor government and the state can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help 
push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy" (Linz and 
Stepan quoted in Henderson 2003: 34). This assumption makes the growth of civil society a 
prerequisite for successful transitions to consolidated democracy. 
In the aftermath of the third wave of democracy, it has become increasingly clear that 
it is hard to defend applying a clear-cut dichotomy of democracy versus autocracy to 
accurately describe the regime type of many of these states today. While there are conflicting 
views among scholars as to whether this development should be classified as a backslide into 
authoritarianism or not (Roberts 2016: 34), there is consensus on and evidence for that “the 
end of the transition paradigm” (Carothers 2002) has come to stay. The transitions turned out 
in many cases not to be from non-democracy to democracy, but rather from non-democracy to 
new and different forms of non-democracy. Hybrid regimes combining authoritarian and 
democratic features have been rapidly on the rise in this period  and today the most common 
form of authoritarian regime is one that regularly holds elections and allows some level of 
opposition to exist (Robertson 2009: 546). In Competititve Authoritarianism: Hybrid  
Regimes After the Cold War (2010), Levitsky and Way explore this multitude of regime types. 
Russia has been an important case of such gray zone regimes and can be categorized as a 
competitive authoritarian regime. In competitive authoritarianism, regimes “practice 
12 
 
authoritarianism behind the institutional facades of representative democracy” (Schedler 
2013: 1). On the surface, regular elections are held. These regimes are therefore not purely 
authoritarian, let alone totalitarian, in the sense that they allow some opposition to exist. 
However, the elections are systematically not free and fair. The playing field is uneven 
(Roberts 2016: 34) – the incumbents are meant to win, and potential challengers are at a 
disadvantaged position that is quite unfamiliar to opposition in liberal democracies.  
Although elections do not function as “instruments of democracy” (Schedler 2013: 2) 
in competitive authoritarian regimes, they may perform important functions in addition to 
camouflaging the true authoritarian colors of the regime. The purposes that elections serve in 
competitive authoritarian regimes differ from the function they have in democracies. Krastev 
and Holmes (2012: 36-38) mention demonstrating national unity, convincing voters that there 
are no good alternatives to the status quo and controlling local elites by including them in 
election manipulation as important examples of how elections matter in Russia.  
Competitive authoritarianism is worthy of a discussion in the context of this thesis 
because it is exactly the hybrid nature of the regime that has been highlighted in the literature 
to explain the apparent dual and at times conflicting goals of the state towards civil society in 
Russia (Robertson 2009: 531-532). Goode notes that the literature on competitive 
authoritarian regimes can appear “myopically focused on elections relative to other regime 
characteristics such as the treatment of civil society” (Goode 2010: 1056).  I argue that 
looking at the treatment of civil society in competitive authoritarian regimes is necessary in 
order to understand how these regimes cope with lack of information. Competitive 
authoritarian regimes display a multitude of formal and informal governing tools. Many are 
characterized by being formal on the surface, but in reality designed for selective use when 
seen fit. By repressing civil society through legal instruments, such as accusing NGOs of 
corruption, crackdown on civil society can be presented as rule of law rather than an 
authoritarian form of targeted persecution (Levitsky and Way 2010:28, Rekosh 2017: 7).   
Competitive authoritarian regimes face the delicate challenge of carefully balancing 
the need to control civil society against the wish of reaping the benefits of having a well-
functioning civil society. Section 2.5 and 2.6 will explore this further by discussing first what 




2.5 How can NGOs be beneficial to competitive authoritarian regimes? 
Schedler points out that understanding the post-third wave competitive authoritarian 
regimes of today is a matter of recognizing that they operate in a landscape characterized by 
political uncertainty. He highlights civil society as one of the areas where decision makers in 
these kinds of regimes need to be wary of the fact that they by default suffer from institutional 
and informational uncertainties (Schedler 2013: 68). Competitive authoritarianism can be 
sustainable, but its sustainability depends on the regime’s ability to cope with these 
uncertainties (Levitsky and Way 2002: 58-59). Limiting political uncertainty is not the only 
reason why competitive authoritarian regimes allow NGOs to operate. Civil society can 
complement the state by providing services that the state is unwilling or unable to provide 
efficiently. Socially oriented NGOs can thus solve challenges that otherwise would require 
scarce resources from government budgets. 
2.5.1 The effects of civic engagement    
Strong civil societies and high levels of civic participation have since Toqueville’s 
“Democracy in America” (1835) been associated with a strengthened effect on democracy 
(Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1994: 182). Toqueville suggests that democracy in the US was solid 
due to its comparatively high level of activity in a wide variety of associations  (Lipset and 
Lakin 2004: 93). In The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, 
Almond and Verba (1965) show how successful democracies owe their success to something 
more than the structures of government and politics alone. Foley and Edwards (1996) 
categorize the adherents of Civil Society I arguments as those who argue that this “something 
more” has to do with civil society. On this background, these scholars tend  to conceptualize 
civil society as “the horizontal development of associations outside of the state through which 
“civic engagement” can be practiced” (Nickel 2012: 65). 
Closely related to Toqueville’s, Almond and Verba’s arguments and to what was 
introduced as Civil Society I in the introduction is the concept of social capital, which 
attracted significant academic attention in the nineties. In Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (1993), Putnam demonstrates how trust, norms and networks can 
facilitate coordinated action and thereby improve the efficiency of society (Putnam, Leonardi 
et al. 1994: 167). Francis Fukuyama criticizes definitions like Putnam’s for referring to 
manifestations of social capital when the goal is to define social capital itself. For him, social 
capital is better understood as “an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation 
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between two or more individuals” (Fukuyama 2001: 7). Trust, networks and civil society, 
Fukuyama goes on to underline, should according to his definition then more precisely be 
termed as the fruits of social capital. In most conceptualizations of social capital, the causal 
mechanisms at work are presumed to be of a reciprocal character, where the “use” of social 
capital itself is expected to result in more of it (Posner and Boix 2016: 686).  Social capital is 
in other words a resource that is created through social interaction (Wong 2007: 17). These 
resources do not reside in individuals, but “[…] in particular networks of people, rather than 
in the people themselves” (Lipset and Lakin 2004: 93). 
Hence, if it is correct that a vibrant civil society increases the level of social capital, 
and that social capital in turn is central to explain economic and political performance, then 
facilitating the production of social capital is a goal for all states – including competitive 
authoritarian regimes – that seek to improve their economic and political performance. 
Supporting the existence of civil society is in other words rational if it is assumed that 
associations in civil society produce social capital that “reduces the costs associated with 
collective action” (Lipset and Lakin 2004: 94), and thus improves quality of governance. 
2.5.2 Mediating interests: Enhancing stability 
Another argument as to how NGOs may be beneficial to competitive authoritarian 
regimes goes back to Schedler’s suggestion concerning these regimes’ need to handle lack of 
information. Because “[…] civil associations help to both represent and moderate interests , 
by facilitating both cooperation and competition among citizens, groups and the state” (Lipset 
and Lakin 2004: 95), authorities can see NGOs as useful instruments for maintaining and 
enhancing stability . The system-destroying potential of civil society can be reined in by 
allowing it to present interests in controlled forms (Sakwa 2015: 193) Where civil society is 
weak or absent, conflicts both between groups as well as between elites and masses will easily 
get out of hand due to lack of arenas where consensus could have been reached at an earlier 
point in time (Lipset and Lakin 2004: 120). Channeling interests into existing political venues  
can in other words boost efficiency as those who are affected get to influence solutions, which 
can make it easier to reach mutually acceptable outcomes (Dryzek and Niemeyer 2010: 145). 
By being key actors in forming a relationship built on consensus between citizens and 
authorities, NGOs can function as valuable contributors to stability in competitive 
authoritarian regimes and help reduce the uncertainty the regime operates under.    
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The (positive) effects of active citizen participation that Civil Society l underlines is 
not a goal exclusive to democratic regimes or to states seeking transition to democracy. As the 
discussion has showed, it is also a rational goal for competitive authoritarian regimes. 
Recalling Fukuyama’s conceptualization of social capital – “an instantiated informal norm 
that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (Fukuyama 2001: 7) –, it can be 
argued that decision makers in competitive authoritarian regimes, with no wish to 
democratize, also will have an interest in developing that norm. Social capital is “conceived 
as a crucial national resource for promoting collective action for the common good” 
(Edwards, Foley et al. 2001: 1). Putnam et al summarize it in this way: “Social capital, as 
embodied in horizontal networks of civic engagement, bolsters the performance of the polity 
and the economy, rather than the reverse: Strong society, strong economy; strong society, 
strong state” (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1994: 176). Since a strong economy and a strong state 
certainly is in the interest of competitive authoritarian regimes that seek to stay in power, they 
also have an interest in giving space to entities that cultivate a strong civil society. 
2.6 How can NGOs be threats to competitive authoritarian regimes? 
Having said that, the arguments described by Civil Society I theory are far from 
completely unproblematic for competitive authoritarian regimes. By taking part in civil 
society, the population develops skills and habits that are valuable to master in public life 
(Howard 2002: 165). Skocpol argues that voluntary associations serve as “[…] schools for 
democratic citizenship, providing an unusually large number of citizens with chances for 
active participation and democratic leverage” (Skocpol 2002: 105). Furthermore, semi-
authoritarian states are likely to be susceptible to so-called naming and shaming-tactics if 
domestic NGOs spread information to actors abroad that have access to ways of pressuring 
the authoritarian state. This makes NGOs potentially costly or threatening to competitive 
authoritarian regimes, as people are democratized from below and become more prone and 
able to hold their leaders accountable.  
2.6.1 Exporting civil society – Western democracy assistance 
Vibrant civil societies can through the arguments sketched out above have the 
potential to contribute considerably to both regime transition as well as in consolidating 
democracy. Francis Fukuyama even declares social capital the very sine qua non of liberal 
democracy (Fukuyama 2001: 7). Neo-Tocquevillian motivations for supporting civil society 
soon prevailed after the Cold War (Henderson 2003: 71, Nickel 2012: 63). Building civil 
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society – often understood as increasing the number of NGOs (Nickel 2012: 64)– was seen as 
something of a magic bullet for speeding up the transition to democracy and as the answer to 
problems the state and market were unable or unwilling to respond to (Sakwa 2015: 192, 
Dupuy, Ron et al. 2016: 1). Pippa Norris suggests that “people who are closely tied together 
are more likely to join forces and build social movements, facilitating the expression of 
collective preferences in democratic polities”(Norris 2011: 136).  
These kinds of arguments have up until today continued to exert influence on how 
Western actors choose to channel democracy aid. For example, the 2014 Norwegian white 
paper Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway’s Foreign Policy and Development 
Cooperation declares that “a strong and pluralistic civil society is a drive-force in efforts to 
promote democratic development, the rule of law and human rights”, and states this as an 
incentive for continued Norwegian support to civil society in other countries (St. meld. nr. 10 
(2014-2015) 2014: 18). In similar fashion, the 2017 UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association upholds  that “a vibrant civil 
society helps to strengthen a state’s democratic credentials and should therefore benefit from 
support and protection similar to the public and private sectors to enable it to make an 
effective contribution”(UN 2017: 7). Underlying the arguments that highlight the importance 
of civil society in democracy development, is the assumption that democracy is something 
more than the minimal definition where free and fair elections are the sufficient features. A 
civil society with at least some degree of civic engagement is here presumed to constitute a 
necessary feature as well (Badescu and Uslaner 2003: 4, Henderson 2003: 2). 
The discussion above has made clear that competitive authoritarian regimes will have 
reason to be cautious of what goes on in civil society and have an interest in controlling the 
parts of civil society that do not conform with the regime. The political parts of civil society 
seldom strive to maintain the status quo – they often seek to push for change. Eliminating the 
meeting spaces for people with goals that can be perceived as intimidating by the state is a 
tempting and rational solution, even though doing so will entail hampering good governance.  
2.6.2 Civil society as an autonomous watchdog and counterweight to the state 
Many of the associations that make up civil society have a political component that 
makes them problematic in competitive authoritarian regimes. The second version of the civil 
society argument is in contrast to the first more concerned with the idea of civil society as a 
counterweight to the state  (Foley and Edwards 1996: 45). Where Civil Society I focuses on 
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the way the presence of “networks of civic engagement” is expected to result in an increase in 
the citizens’ ability to cooperate for the common good –“for a mutual benefit” (Putnam, 
Leonardi et al. 1994: 173), Civil Society II on the other hand is more political and in essence 
about the watchdog function of civil society. In other words, while Civil Society I highlights 
the fruits of the act of association, Civil Society II perceives the value of the autonomy of the 
associations as the most important aspect. This second version of the civil society argument is 
more problematic to cope with for the competitive authoritarian regimes than the first version 
of the argument. The NGOs that are the subjects of study in this thesis all work in the field of 
human rights and performing the watchdog role is thus central to their existence. NGOs that 
focus on rights are confrontational by nature and therefore at risk of being perceived as 
threatening and consequentially become the targets of restrictive legislation (Ljubownikow 
and Crotty 2017: 942).  
Theda Skocpol (2002: 104) refers to civil society organizations as a source of 
considerable leverage on the political process in the sense that they can be effective 
instruments in promoting the common interests of their members and in working to ensure 
that their preferences are taken into account when decisions are made. Examples ranging from 
the Arab spring, occupy Wall Street, to the Polish solidarity movement illustrate that civil 
society movements can have far-reaching consequences that can make them a serious threat to 
stability in the eyes of the state. Color revolutions in neighboring states have been pointed out 
in the literature as decisive for explaining the onset of the pushback on civil society (Howell, 
Ishkanian et al. 2008: 85, Carothers 2016: 359). The color revolutions in Georgia in 2003 and 
Ukraine in 2004 were perceived as destabilizing by Russia, as Western NGO funding was 
seen as significant for the outcome (Henderson 2011: 19). A study that compared color 
revolutions that succeeded and those that failed, found that the strength of civil society is a 
key factor: The stronger the civil society in a state, the more likely that a color revolution 
would result in power shifting hands (Wolchik 2012: 67). When hybrid regimes witnessed 
what civil society coupled with foreign democracy assistance could achieve, it accelerated the 
motivation to implement measures designed to prevent them from falling victim to the same 
trend (Gershman and Allen 2006: 37). By acknowledging that Civil Society II contains 
elements that open up for seeing NGOs as a security threat to state stability, we can explore 
the rational motives behind crackdown on civil society. 
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2.6.3 Naming and shaming - Pressure to respond to international demands 
Literature on transnational networks have tended to take the Civil Society II approach 
(Taylor 2011: 215). This strand of literature is particularly engaged with investigating why 
and how civil society’s efforts to join forces across borders can increase civil society’s ability 
to act as a counterweight to the state. In Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink align 
with Civil Society II when they study several cases of transnational activism and introduce the 
concept of boomerang patterns. The boomerang effect (illustrated in figure 1) occurs when 
NGOs in state A experience difficulties with influencing policy processes, so they turn to 
likeminded NGOs in state B. By doing so they may be able to exert influence on state A 
through state B (Keck and Sikkink 2014: 13). Assuming that the boomerang pattern is a 
powerful mechanism for voicing issues and for effectively exercising pressure on states 
through international “naming and shaming”, it will be rational for repressive states to seek 
out ways to block the boomerang pattern from working.  
  
 
Figure 1 The Boomerang model 
 Keck and Sikkink (2014: 116-120) suggest that transnational human rights networks 
are able to succeed when they document violations of human rights and frame these in a way 
that attract international attention. They stress that international NGOs will struggle to achieve 
this on their own – domestic NGOs play a fundamental role here. However, they continue, the 
existence of such a transnational network with locally rooted NGOs is in itself not a sufficient 
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criterion for achieving change in a country’s human rights situation. Opportunities for 
applying effective pressure on the state in question are decisive. Economic incentives and 
sanctions are well-known tools that states can use if they aim to encourage another state to 
make normative changes in its perception of human rights. Keck and Sikkink acknowledge 
this kind of leverage and the effect it can have but claim that moral pressure can be at least as 
important. The idea is that if states care about their international reputation, they would like to 
avoid being thought of as tyrannical.  
Naming and shaming tactics were presumed to encourage states to follow international 
norms. However, new research raises doubt about the usefulness of this approach. Literature 
has concentrated on how states respond to international pressure (Tarrow 2005, Keck and 
Sikkink 2014), but why and under what conditions  they choose to avoid conforming to 
pressure have been less focused upon (Terman 2017: 1). In an unpublished article, Terman 
develops the concept of defiance. Defiance “refers to the net increase in the commitment to or 
incidence of norm-offending behavior caused by a defensive reaction to norm sanctioning” 
and is most likely to occur when transnational advocacy is perceived to be a form of symbolic 
domination (Terman 2017: 1). Under such circumstances, norm defiance can be turned around 
as a sign of strength – “a badge of honor” (Adler-Nissen 2014: 144). Competitive 
authoritarian regimes will then have an interest in minimizing civil society’s opportunities to 
act as a watchdog and a counterweight to the state. Hindering foreign “democracy assistance” 
efforts will be of particular interest.  
2.7.1 Privileging certain forms of advocacy  
The discussion so far has showed that competitive authoritarian regimes have several 
rational objectives to avoid strangling civil society. One is implied by Keck and Sikkink’s 
boomerang model: initial repression of civil society may lead to greater international pressure 
on an issue. Consequently, applying restrictions may in fact accelerate unwanted pressure. 
Another is inherent in the Tocquevillian argument – the fact that high levels of social capital, 
which vibrant civil societies are known to be linked with, are important in explaining quality 
of governance (Posner and Boix 2016: 690). A third lies in civil society’s ability to provide 
some services more effectively than the state.  
When competitive authoritarian regimes are careful not to make conditions for civil 
society too unbearable, they seem to accept the assumption that “the production and 
reproduction of loyalty, civility, political competence, and trust in authority are never the 
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work of the state alone, and the effort to go it alone – one meaning of totalitarianism – is 
doomed to failure” (Walzer 1991: 8). If we accept this argument, it means that complete 
alienation of civil society is a disaster-prone and unprofitable strategy, destined to result in 
destabilization in the long run. The growth in consultative organs and support for civil society 
in Russia – also to some degree the parts of it that protest the regime – could be seen as a 
result of a growing demand for better and more responsive governance in order to compete in 
an increasingly global world (Richter 2009b: 41). Complete repression of civil society is 
simply not an option for modern world’s competitive authoritarian regimes seeking stability. 
In accordance with their hybrid nature, they need a hybrid approach to govern civil society.  
While much focus and academic attention have been directed towards regulation that 
in different ways restricts civil society’s political opportunity structures, less emphasis has 
been given to regulation that shapes civil society’s political opportunity structures in other 
ways (Salamon, Benevolenski et al. 2015: 2180, Owen and Bindman 2017: 6). In a world of 
shrinking space for civil society, it is of interest also to research what kind of advocacy is 
encouraged in competitive authoritarian regimes. The stick is not the only way to regulate – 
carrots are also frequently used. By giving privileges to the form of advocacy the regime 
prefers, states can aim at incentivizing behavior that is known to result in benefits while at the 
same time limit possibilities for destabilization of the regime.  
Owen and Bindman (2017: 17) discuss the concept of limited pluralism and suggest 
that for competitive authoritarian regimes, encouraging a limited form of pluralism imply 
cherry-picking features from liberal democracy that fit with their interests, while skipping 
those that do not. Selective employment of consultative mechanisms thus appears as another 
tool for constructing an uneven playing field. Can competitive authoritarian regimes create 
public consultative structures that allow for reaping the benefits of civil society? If they can, 
then the next natural question is whether they at the same time can succeed at limiting civil 
society in such a manner that critical voices do not disturb the stability of the regime in 
power. This is where limited pluralism comes in. 
2.7.2 Limited pluralism: Authoritarian deliberation 
The use of deliberative and consultative mechanisms through the involvement of non-
state actors is on the rise in Russia (Owen and Bindman 2017: 2). Participation in such organs 
is attractive to NGOs as they represent opportunities to influence policymaking. The state, on 
the other hand, can profit from the involvement in two main ways: Firstly, it can receive 
21 
 
information that otherwise would have gone unnoticed and secondly, it can produce an 
increased sense of legitimacy because consensus is reached in cooperation (Dryzek and 
Niemeyer 2010: 148). This can serve to enhance stability for competitive authoritarian 
regimes, although it remains to be seen if deliberation can play a role in democratization and 
if it truly contributes to pluralizing the policy process. On the surface, creating spaces where 
civil society can communicate with the authorities can appear as a genuine attempt at 
facilitating the expression of diverse viewpoints. However, there is reason to discuss if this 
really is the case and question the motivation behind the creation of consultative organs in 
competitive authoritarian regimes. Recall Taylor (1990: 98) and his third sense of civil 
society: When “the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflict the course 
of state policy.” Skeptics could here argue that when the state adopts mechanisms for 
negotiation with civil society that borders on corporatism, new opportunities arise for state 
suppression of civil society. Taylor is aware of this danger when he writes that the third 
understanding of civil society “will not be easily accepted by one who suspects that the 
associations are in fact being integrated into the state apparatus, rather than bringing to bear 
their independent weight on it” (Taylor 1990: 98).   
The starting point for this thesis is the observation that there are puzzling 
contradictions in the way Russia’s civil society is governed, with harsh restrictions on the one 
hand and new opportunities on the other hand. However, some researchers do not agree that 
Russia’s civil society faces a dual reality and see both the carrots and the sticks as two sides 
of the same coin. To Daucé, “allocating public funding to Russian human rights groups is […] 
the second part of the enforcement of the foreign agent law” (Salamon, Benevolenski et al. 
2015: 2182). Consultative organs and funding opportunities are here argued to be designed as 
tools for a silent and more subtle form of repression of civil society and NGOs (Daucé 2014: 
251). Salamon et al criticize Daucé for assuming that the state is one, coherent, rational actor, 
when reality often is that different actors within government may have competing, rational 






2.8 Backlash on democracy: Closing space for civil society 
 
The idea of civil society has long been a magical construct, one that has somehow 
succeeded in simultaneously satisfying modernization theorists’ belief in the historical 
mission of the middle class, the New Left’s fascination with spontaneous activism, 
neoliberals’ affection for antistatism, and Western donors’ fondness for English-
speaking NGOs. But today that construct is losing its appeal. (Krastev quoted in 
Sakwa 2015: 193) 
International efforts to “make democracy work” (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1994) by 
supporting civil society are increasingly facing obstacles (Gershman and Allen 2006, 
Christensen and Weinstein 2013, Carothers 2016, Dupuy, Ron et al. 2016, Wolff 2018). 
Restriction of civil society’s political opportunity structures as a form of defiance to 
international pressure should here be seen in the context of a broader trend of pushback on 
democracy assistance. Civil society in authoritarian regimes all across the world has since the 
middle of the last decade been experiencing not only that the transition has come to a halt, but 
furthermore a loss of possibilities and rights that earlier had been achieved (Carothers 2016: 
359).  In the mid-2000s, competitive authoritarian regimes began to view Western democracy 
assistance with skepticism and as “illegitimate political meddling” that should be met with 
defense mechanisms (Carothers 2006). How did hybrid regimes come to see democracy 
assistance as an undesirable presence and a threat to their interests? It has been argued that the 
form the promotion of democracy took has contributed to the backlash on democracy that 
many of the third wave-countries now are facing to differing degrees (Sakwa 2011: 1). 
Gershman and Allen contend that the backlash should be seen as a phenomenon intimately 
connected to the hybrid regimes of the third wave of democracy (Gershman and Allen 2006: 
37). 
Concepts such as the “closing” and “shrinking space” for civil society and “pushback 
on democracy promotion” are increasingly receiving attention from researchers worldwide 
who seek to explain the crisis in conditions for human rights activism. Some however 
question whether it is reasonable to talk about a crisis-trend at all, and secondly claiming that 
doing so may have negative consequences.  
Kinzelbach and Spannagel claim that the meaning of the term “closing space” has 
been extended to cover far more than it covered when it was initially coined (Kinzelbach and 
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Spannagel 2018: 185). In an influential report by Carothers and Brechenmacher in 2014 that 
popularized the concept, they originally referred to closing space as the growth in laws that 
through regulation of NGOs aimed to hinder international democracy support (Carothers and 
Brechemacher 2014). According to Kinzelbach and Spannagel, the term has today expanded 
to rather mean a more general wide wave of repression against civil society – a notion they 
question the correctness of, and imply that observers and political scientists have let 
themselves be carried away by the hype of the over-stretched concept. The concept of 
“closing space” can thus be argued to be a victim of conceptual stretching, which occurs when 
a concept is broadened in meaning and thereby the range of applications of the concept is 
broadened as well (Sartori 1970: 1034). The consequences of conceptual stretching can be 
severe, as it leads to loss in precision. When a concept is stretched, the scope of what it covers 
is pushed to include instances that are beyond what would be included in the original concept. 
Comparison becomes complicated, as it is unclear what one actually is analyzing. This thesis 
therefore aligns with the original understanding of the concept of closing space for civil 
society and will therefore be limited to look at the responses to the new forms of repression.  
Repression can be understood as “an action which raises the contender’s cost of 
collective action” (Tilly quoted in Van Der Vet and Lyytikäinen 2015: 983). Human rights 
activists in authoritarian regimes have always been at risk of being affected by actions that 
aim at this, and repression has often taken severe forms with consequences for the life and 
health of activists. Sikkink therefore accuses those who present the idea of a crisis in human 
rights activism of being too pessimistic and of overlooking the long lines in the history of 
human rights activism. She warns that framing human rights activism today as in a state of 
crisis in addition to being simplistic can have harmful consequences, such as loss of faith in 
that standing up for something can have an impact (Sikkink 2018: 172). While protesting the 
use of crisis framing, Sikkink acknowledges that we are witnessing the spread of restrictive 
measures that were rare or nonexistent in the last century (Sikkink 2018: 175). Amongst these 
are formal restrictions on foreign funding and increased use of time and resource consuming 
registration procedures. Older strategies for clamping down on civil society include smear 
campaigns, attacks against media and restriction of fundamental rights. 
The authoritarians of today must in any case use another set of tools than their 20th 
century predecessors in order to succeed at staying in power (Robertson 2009: 531). That 
unequivocally means that the human rights defenders of the 21st century also must employ 
new strategies in order to succeed at their work. What, then, are the new forms of repression 
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that characterizes the age of closing space for civil society? The new tools employed to 
control civil society all across the world share many similarities. In a comparative study on 
pushback on civil society in Russia, Egypt and Ethiopia, Brechenmacher finds that among the 
most common strategies used are delegitimization, sweeping legislative measures, selective 
targeting, and creation of alternative civic actors (Brechenmacher 2017: 90-97).  
1) Delegitimization can be done by accusing NGOs that rely on foreign funding for 
working against national sovereignty by supporting the motives of other states (Gershman and 
Allen 2006: 41). In a similar vein, they can be portrayed as elites that are incapable of 
understanding ordinary people’s real-life struggles. Furthermore, NGOs can be delegitimized 
by employing anti-extremism rhetoric (Carothers and Brechemacher 2014: 29).     
2) Delegitimization creates a favorable foundation for introducing sweeping legislative 
measures. Through rapid implementation of new laws that are characterized by their catch-all 
vague conceptualizations, NGOs find themselves navigating in new and unclear waters where 
the depth of the water can change arbitrarily (Gershman and Allen 2006: 42).  
3) Broad legislation in turn sets the stage for selective targeting. Selective law 
enforcement has proved to be a particularly useful strategy for rulers steering in the uncertain 
terrain of hybrid regimes with – on paper - democratic values and procedures (Bækken 2016: 
342).   
4) However, restricting civil society alone is however not all. Creating alternative 
civic actors is also an important ingredient in the recipe that when mixed together shape the 
political opportunity structures for civil society in competitive authoritarian regimes, also in 
Russia (Gershman and Allen 2006: 44-45). By creating a framework that offers different 
opportunities, where NGOs are divided into those who are cheered forward for being useful, 
and those who touch on more political issues are met with a more hostile approach, 
competitive authoritarian regimes can aim to preserve the benefits that come with having an 
active civil society while at the same time limit the parts of civil society that can be 
potentially harmful to the regime. Divide-and-conquer tactics provides the public with a 
chaotic impression of the human rights community, which again further contributes to 
delegitimization (Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez 2018: 33). Summed up, human rights 
NGOs that work on less political issues and NGOs that are service providers will be expected 
to both on an informal and formal level face different and less severe restrictions than those 
who focus on the more political issues. 
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The closing space-phenomenon has been characterized by the use of “soft” 
restrictions, as opposed to more brutal and “uncivilized” methods, such as physically harming 
activists. Daucé suggests that this actually has led to a decline in direct physical violence 
against activists (Daucé 2014: 239). Administrative crackdown seems to be the preferred 
choice. Laws targeting the activities of NGOs that receive funding from abroad have been on 
the rise worldwide. Restrictions on foreign NGO funding have been found to often come 
about in the aftermath of competitive elections (Dupuy, Ron et al. 2016: 8). The protests in 
the aftermath of the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011 and 2012 are therefore 
interesting in the Russian context (Wolchik 2012: 67).  
2.9 NGOs responding to closing space 
What does the literature have to say on how civil society meets the new forms of 
challenges described in the last section? Social movement literature underlines that 
participation in activism is based on a rational evaluation of potential costs and benefits (Van 
Der Vet and Lyytikäinen 2015: 983). How professional human rights NGOs choose to 
respond to changed opportunity structures is then shaped by the people who participate as 
activists, so that the response is expected to be the result of a cost-benefit analysis. At the 
same time, human rights work is deeply characterized by issues of emotional character, which 
makes describing activism as question of rational choice somewhat problematic. Based on 
emotional attachment, people choose to participate despite what can sometimes be high risk 
(Van Der Vet and Lyytikäinen 2015: 983). 
Delegitimization, sweeping legislative measures, selective targeting, and creation of 
alternative civic actors are all powerful tools that keep turning up when competitive 
authoritarian states aim to control civil society. I will now connect these strategies with 
literature that touch upon possible responses that NGOs can turn to when their opportunities 
are increasingly limited. Based on this literature review of responses, I will present five 
hypotheses concerning how NGOs respond to closing space with opportunities of 
participating in limited pluralism. These hypotheses will be applied to the Russian human 
rights context in chapter five and will be used to guide the empirical analysis. 
2.9.1 Responding to broad legislation and selective targeting: Searching for 
regulatory alternatives 
A natural defense mechanism against laws that specifically target the NGO model of 
organizing as conceptualized above is to search for new ways to operate that allow for 
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continuing working for the issues they are engaged with. While pursuing the NGO-form has 
led to a professionalized civil society capable of promoting demands and working for a cause 
in an efficient manner, it has also left civil society vulnerable for repressive measures. 
Affected NGOs will look for available loopholes, and experiment with them until they close. 
The hunt for loopholes leads to a sort of cat and mouse game, where both state and civil 
society engage in a learning by doing process. Rekosh (2017: 8) mentions some possible 
alternative organizational structures that vulnerable NGOs have had different degrees of 
success with adopting: 
- Establish a new entity of a similar nature  
- Start a commercial firm to avoid extra regulatory burdens  
- Organize their activities as an informal group of individuals without a legal entity  
- Move abroad 
Research shows that NGOs at risk tend to opt for becoming either more or less formal 
(Brechenmacher 2017: 100). Both strategies have their respective advantages and 
disadvantages. Becoming more formal, as for example by shapeshifting into status as a lawyer 
company, may work temporarily. However, as discussed in the last section, selective targeting 
is a central part of the package that together constitutes the assault on civil society, and any 
form of formal status can therefore be at risk.  
H1: NGOs will search for alternative ways of structuring themselves. 
2.9.2 Responding to attempts at divide and conquer: Building broad coalitions  
Becoming less formal can be a clever way to dodge selective bullets. By not being a 
target, one cannot be selectively targeted. On the downside, loosely organized activists will 
struggle to maintain a steady economic situation, as both getting funding from abroad and 
government will be hard without a formal status. Formal participation in consultative channels 
reserved for representatives from the professionalized human rights community will also be at 
risk. The downsides of going in a more loosely organized direction can however be 
diminished by entering mutually beneficial partnerships with established NGOs. Building 
broad networks consisting of different types of civil society actors can be vital in 
counteracting negative governmental campaigns (Wolff 2018: 133). By developing a sense of 
solidarity across different forms of organizations, people who share the same ideas can utilize 
the advantages and avoid the disadvantages of the different forms of organizing. Glasius and 
Ishkanian has coined this type of relationship as “surreptitious symbiosis”, which is when 
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“activists rely on NGOs for technical support for things like meeting space and printing to 
avoid direct reliance on the material logic of fundraising; and for legal aid and information 
about government plans to help protect against, and indirectly engage with, the coercive logic 
of the state” (Glasius and Ishkanian 2015: 2623).  
In this sense, restrictions can contribute to rationalize more cooperation and solidarity 
between different types of groups in civil society – ranging from independent activists to 
established professionalized NGOs. One expectation that will be looked closer at in the 
analysis chapter is therefore the presence of a “surreptitious symbiosis” between loosely 
organized activists and professional human rights NGOs, where they can enjoy the benefits 
offered by diverse ways of structuring in different settings in order to effectively voice their 
issues. 
H2: Different actors in civil society will forge alliances and cooperate in ways that 
make the most out of their diverse organizational forms. 
2.9.3 Responding to delegitimization: New narratives, focus on grassroots 
mobilization and new funding models 
Keck and Sikkink suggest that activists have a powerful opportunity to deliberately 
use vulnerability to frame the issue they are seeking to shed light on (Keck and Sikkink 2014: 
204). By framing the issue in a way that focuses on bodily harm, human rights activists can 
maximize the attraction of public and foreign attention.  
Pushback measures are often quite well backed by ordinary citizens (Carothers 2016: 
370). According to Mendelson (2015: 5), “space is closing in part because governments can 
put restrictions in place with little response or reaction by citizens”. Appealing to the need to 
ensure national sovereignty has turned out to be a fruitful way to gain support for restrictive 
measures in states that for the last three decades have been targets for Western civil society 
support. Wolff argues that building support at the grass root level is vital for NGOs that seek 
to succeed in semi-authoritarian settings. Similarly, Tiwana (2018: 163) suggests that the 
“struggle for hearts and minds” needs to intensify at the local level when civil society respond 
to delegitimization. One assumption is therefore that affected NGOs will respond to 
delegitimization attempts by trying to reframe the issues they are working on as legitimate 
interests that do not collide with the national interest and by focusing more on building a 
supporter base at the grass root level. 
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H3: NGOs will increase their efforts to build a domestic base of supporters and 
reframe their issues to become attractive to the broader layers of the population.  
Wolff goes on to underline that the most efficient way to respond to the foreign agent-
rhetoric is to simply choose to say no thanks to foreign funding (Wolff 2018: 132). However, 
turning down a much-needed stable source of income from trusted and well-connected 
partners that one has cooperated with for a couple of decades is no simple solution. Dupuy, 
Ron et al. (2016: 9) conclude that NGOs aiming to survive stricter conditions have much to 
gain if they manage to mobilize resources at the domestic level, as this will serve to 
strengthen their legitimacy at the grassroots level. The legitimacy that comes with 
representing the interests of groups can be severely challenged if those who claim to represent 
these interests have weak linkages to the groups they represent and rely almost exclusively on 
funding received from other sources (Mendelson 2015: 5, Rekosh 2017: 61). This highlights 
one of the main criticisms surrounding Western democracy export and civil society support. 
Civil society is fundamentally a grass roots phenomenon, and it can therefore be questioned to 
what extent top-down civil society building can succeed.  
 Dupuy, Ron et al. (2016: 9) propose that “if citizens are willing to pay for civil 
society, they may also be more willing to stand by it” and go on to stress that the potential is 
biggest in states with moderate repression. Christensen and Weinstein also emphasize this 
argument, and furthermore underline other possibilities for developing sustainable funding 
options, such as domestic philanthropy (Christensen and Weinstein 2013: 90) A central issue 
here is to what extent there exists a potential donor base, and how this potential differs 
depending on what sphere of human rights the NGO is working on. NGOs working on issues 
that are generally more often met with hostility from the majority population, such as 
LGBTQ+ matters, are expected to have a harder time reaching out to the broad population 
than those who work on issues that that are more universally supported (Ron, Kaire et al. 
2018: 154).  
Focusing on increasing accountability can be a powerful way to disarm 
delegitimization efforts, as experiments show that ordinary people in low-income countries 
are more likely to donate to human rights groups that are fiscally transparent. Being fiscally 
trustworthy was valued above being highly effective and above those who were presented as 
being directly responsible for helping a specific individual (Ron, Kaire et al. 2018: 156). 
NGOs can have much to win at presenting themselves as trustworthy in the eyes of the 
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domestic constituency not only because it can increase funding, but also because it takes away 
much of the foundation for delegitimizing them as the puppets of foreign interests. 
H4: NGOs will seek to diversify their sources of funding and look for domestic 
funding opportunities when foreign funding is restricted. 
2.9.4 Responding to co-optation attempts: Reaching for “effectiveness politics” 
This response goes back to limited pluralism, which was discussed earlier in this 
chapter. Sikkink argues that human rights activists that face new forms of restrictions should 
rely less on “[…] ‘naming and shaming’ and more on what might be called ‘effectiveness 
politics’—identifying techniques and campaigns that have been effective to discern how best 
to improve human rights” (Sikkink quoted in Rodríguez-Garavito and Gomez 2018: 34). 
When naming and shaming has become less effective and harder to succeed at due to new 
regulations that complicate transnational activism, human rights NGOs need to look new 
ways to achieve their goals. Taking part in government-initiated consultative organs and 
control mechanisms represent one such technique for “effectiveness politics”. Carothers notes 
that “civil society programs at both the national and local level in transitional countries now 
typically seek a productive dialogue with state institutions and view state and civil society as 
partners more than opponents” (Carothers, quoted in Taylor 2011: 215). 
However, on the part of the groups that are in focus in this thesis – human rights 
NGOs – opportunities to take part in forums for limited pluralism constitute a dilemma 
according to the literature at hand. On the one hand, they want to be able to pursue what 
Sikkink called “effectiveness politics”, which should imply a pragmatic approach where any 
advantageous tool available is put to use. On the other hand, although the cherries picked 
from liberal democracy may be tempting to grab for civil society actors in competitive 
authoritarian regimes, the advantages may be overshadowed.  Institutions reflect the interests 
of those who create them (Geddes 1995: 239). When assessing the function and impact of 
consultative organs in competitive authoritarian regimes, one should have in mind that it 
matters who created these organs and for what purpose. By improving governance through 
taking part in consultative structures and control mechanisms, NGOs can subsequently also 
contribute to legitimize the regime (Lorch and Bunk 2017: 991). Based on this dilemma, two 
opposing strategies for NGOs are identified. On the one hand, there is reason to assume that 
human rights NGOs will choose pragmatic “effectiveness politics” and therefore take part in 
any government-initiated structure where they can have an impact. On the other hand, they 
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may perceive co-optation invitations as attempts at using them to legitimize the regime and 
will therefore choose not to participate. Hypothesis number five takes the first approach, and 
states that: 
H5:  Faced with restrictions, NGOs will embrace the limited opportunities they 
are left with and therefore choose to participate in deliberative organs. 
 
2.10 Summed up 
This chapter has conceptualized key terms, provided a review of existing literature, 
and left us with five hypotheses concerning how NGOs finding themselves in closing space 
for civil society are expected to respond. It has explored different civil society arguments 
provided by theory that motivated Western democracy support to post-communist countries. 
While some parts of what was termed the civil society argument fit well with the interests of 
competitive authoritarian regimes, other parts of the argument are more complicated to handle 
the consequences of. The literature sheds light on why NGOs both can have the potential to 
destabilize as well as stabilize competitive authoritarian regimes. Competitive authoritarian 
regimes’ use of limited pluralism in the form of deliberative bodies was discussed as a way of 
ensuring stability. Understanding the dual potential of civil society was argued to be central in 
order to understand the combination of closing space for civil society and new opportunities 




3 Research Design: Method and data 
3.1 The implications of the research question for the research design 
This thesis takes a qualitative approach. I have used primary sources collected on a 
three-week long fieldwork, as well as secondary sources. I chose to conduct semistructured 
interviews as the research question requires information on how NGOs themselves experience 
the situation:   
In what ways do Russian human rights NGOs respond to new restrictions, and why 
and how do they participate in co-optation efforts from the state? 
The research question posed in this thesis invites to an explorative approach. The goal 
of this thesis is not to test theories, but it can contribute to explore and develop explanations 
that can be generalized to other events. The strength of the case study as a research design lies 
in its potential to shed light on new explanations (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 71).  Cases can 
be seen as “vehicles for constructing and supporting broader theoretical generalizations” 
(Levy 2008: 14). As it is the goal of this thesis to construct new insights on how NGOs in 
closing space for civil society adapt, the case study approach is a well-suited choice of 
research design to answer the research question. 
Fieldwork increases the likelihood that the researcher’s former assumptions based on 
secondary sources can be challenged and refined through direct observations of the “messy 
reality” (Goode 2010: 1067). It is exactly the “messy reality” that my research question is 
seeking to say something about. Although I arrived well prepared and had extensive 
knowledge of the conditions for human rights NGOs, I experienced that my expectations were 
confronted and in need of refinement.  
Conducting face-to-face interviews can provide insights that would be hard to obtain 
when relying exclusively on other data sources. This is especially the case in authoritarian 
settings, where this kind of information is sensitive and can be hard to acquire unless 
anonymity is guaranteed. Semistructured interviews with open-ended questions is a suitable 
method here, as it provides respondents with the possibility of being the experts and hence 
contribute in making available valuable information to the research (Leech 2002: 668). By 
having some structure to the interviews and asking everyone approximately similar questions, 
I could compare the answers from the different NGOs. 
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Relying on interviews alone would be insufficient, and I have used a wide variety of 
other sources in both preparation to do fieldwork and also as evidence in this thesis. The 
additional data material includes academic articles, news pieces, reports, tweets, official 
statements and speeches, statistics from the Russian Ministry of Justice, Russian laws, the 
NGOs’ webpages, official government webpages and more. Using a wide variety of sources 
has to some degree enabled me to cross-check the reliability of the information I collected 
from the interviews. This is the process of triangulation, where the researcher tests the 
accuracy by using two different methods to confirm or disconfirm the correctness of a claim. 
Three wrongs do not make on right, and triangulation cannot guarantee that several sources 
are not incorrect. It does however help give a more complete overview.  
3.2 The single-case study: What can this study say something about? 
The case-oriented approach sets complexity above generality. Where the variable-
oriented approach is concerned with testing hypotheses suggested by theory, the case-oriented 
approach seeks to  “[unravel] the historical conditions that produce different historical 
outcomes” (Ragin 1989: 55).  
 Gerring understands case studies as “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively 
bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of 
similar phenomena” (Gerring 2004: 341). George and Bennet also recognize the prospects of 
being able to identify generalizable findings as part of the goal of doing case study research. 
They define case studies as “[…] the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode 
to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George, 
Bennett et al. 2005: 5).  
In line with George and Bennet’s definition of case studies, this thesis is in other 
words an attempt at examining some aspects of some Russian human rights NGOs responses 
to the pushback on civil society over the last fifteen years to develop historical explanations 
that may be generalizable to other events. In Gerring’s words, the “relatively bounded 
phenomenon” that I seek to understand is the survival strategies of oppressed NGOs in 
authoritarian regimes. As explored in chapter two, the pushback on civil society combined 
with authoritarian deliberation is by many researchers seen as part of a global trend. There are 
numerous country (and locally) specific explanations as to how human rights NGOs respond 
to the pushback, and this thesis seeks to explain the specific case of Russia.  
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In quantitative work, researchers seek to analyze a set of cases with the goal of being 
able to say something about the bigger population, and on this background qualitative 
methods have been criticized for being particularly vulnerable to selection bias.  Qualitative 
researchers, on the other hand, “are frequently concerned about the heterogeneity of causal 
relations, which is one of the reasons they are often skeptical about quantitative studies that 
are broadly comparative” (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 68). Qualitative methods can therefore 
be said to trade generalizability for the advantage of validity. Summarized, the qualitative 
researcher “can analyze his smaller number of cases more thoroughly, and he is less 
dependent on data that he cannot properly evaluate”  (Lijphart 1975: 171).  
While this study recognizes the good reasons for being skeptical of the single-case 
study’s potential for saying something valid about a bigger set of cases, some generalizable 
findings may result. Chapter two categorized Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime 
with a totalitarian past, and although my research question is highly specific and directly 
aimed at understanding the Russian case with regard to human rights NGOs, this thesis may 
also contribute to shed light on how recently democratizing states by building legal, 
institutional and financial frameworks can shape the costs of organization for NGOs.  
As a typical case of a competitive authoritarian regime that has put restrictive 
measures on civil society in recent time, this study can contribute to generate hypotheses for 
comparison of a larger class of similar cases. Another way in which the single-case study can 
be said to have a comparative nature can be explained by understanding the single-case as 
always involving several observations. Gerring defends such an understanding by outlining 
three different levels where the single-case study can be comparative; I) diachronic: Variation 
in a single case over time; II) synchronic: Within-case variation at a single point in time; III) a 
combination of diachronic and synchronic analysis research (Gerring 2004: 343). As this 
study asks how Russian human rights NGOs has changed their approach, the analysis is 
inherently diachronic because it examines the variation in responding to restrictions over a 
certain period, namely the last fifteen years. Since this study answers the research question by 
investigating the strategies of different NGO-like entities at a given point in time (February 
2018), it is also synchronic. Hence, this single-case study is an example of a combination of 




3. 3 Experience with fieldwork and conducting academic interviews 
A central part of the data material used in this thesis was gathered on a three weeks long 
fieldwork to St. Petersburg and Moscow in February 2018. I conducted semistructured 
interviews with nine employees and one volunteer from seven different NGOs, former NGOs 
or NGO-like “places” working in the sphere of human rights, as well as one interview at the 
St. Petersburg ombudsman for human rights office. An overview of the respondents can be 
found in the appendix. Not every NGO operates in the form of an actual NGO anymore, but 
for the sake of clarity I refer to them as NGOs throughout the thesis because they used to be 
NGOs and still operate similarly. As one interviewee put it: “We're not an […] NGO now 
technically, although we are in substance” (Interview 9).  
The interview guide that I designed for the interviews can be found in the appendix. 
Consent to participation in the study was given orally. The study was reported to and 
approved by the Norwegian data authorities (NSD) and has the project number 57833. 
Everyone interviewed for this thesis was informed that their identities would be anonymized 
(except the head of staff at the St Petersburg Ombudsman for human rights office), and that 
they at any time are free to withdraw their consent from the study. The choice to anonymize 
the respondents was made after close consideration of the pros and cons connected with 
anonymizing. The main reason for keeping the identities of my respondents hidden is the 
sensitive nature of the theme that I am studying. I wanted to increase the likelihood that my 
respondents both actually were safe as well as feeling safe about sharing information with me.  
Good use of semistructured interviews demands that the researcher has done a thorough 
job in preparing for the interview and has extensive background knowledge about the issue in 
question (Peabody, Hammond et al. 1990: 452). To get the most out of the interviews, I 
therefore designed my interview guide with the purpose of mainly collecting information that 
would be hard to come across in other ways. At the same time, I did not want to risk that the 
respondents would avoid mentioning valuable information because they assumed that I was 
familiar with it already. To minimize this risk I followed the strategy suggested by Leech 
(2002: 665-666): “I present myself as having little or no idea about what happened behind the 
scenes in the given policy issue I am interviewing about. I try to continue this approach even 
after I have conducted many interviews on the same policy issue”. To be attentive to both of 
these considerations at the same time can be a challenge, as achieving a balance between 
presenting myself as well prepared on one hand and on the other hand as not too much of an 
expert is in contrast with each other. 
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Most of the interviews lasted for about 40 minutes. All the interviews were conducted 
in the workplaces of the interviewees. This was useful for several reasons. First of all, their 
workplace is a well-known setting for the interviewee and comfortable in the sense that they 
did not have to go anywhere to meet with me. Creating rapport and an atmosphere where the 
respondents are relaxed makes it more likely that they will open up and share valuable 
information (Leech 2002: 665). Secondly, it turned out to be practical in the situations where 
the respondents said that they for some reason felt uncertain whether they could give me the 
answer to a question. We could knock on the next office door and speak with another 
employee who had more expertise on that particular question. In this sense, conducting the 
interviews at the workplaces allowed for spur-of-the-moment snowballing to get new 
respondents within the same NGO. Thirdly, when it was natural I could spontaneously use the 
surroundings as a source of inspiration to ask probing-questions in the course of the interview. 
For example, in one interview the respondent told me that their NGO really did not have any 
powerful friends in consultative organs. Here I could point at a diploma hanging on the wall 
awarded to a well-known human rights defender who has a long history in that NGO and who 
is a longtime member of the PCHRCS and ask: “But does it not work to your advantage to 
have good connections with [name]?”. Similarly, another time a respondent came with 
unexpected statements that I knew differed from the official standpoint of the NGO. At the 
desk, I recognized a report the NGO had issued and that I had read online and nodded towards 
it and asked a question that took up the diverging viewpoints. 
I asked permission to record the interviews, and none of the respondents were opposed 
to this. Recording the interviews allowed me to pay full attention to the conversation as it 
unfolded, without having to worry about missing anything as I would have if I relied on 
taking notes at the same time. I could concentrate fully about being a present participant, 
ready to pose relevant follow-up questions. Listening to the interviews quite soon after I had 
conducted them also turned out to be a good strategy for becoming a better interviewer. 
Having never done academic interviews or seen anyone do it, I experienced that learning by 
doing was effective. By evaluating my performance in the first couple of interviews, I became 
aware of what was working well and what I should change concerning both the questions I 
was asking and the way I was leading the conversation. In particular I improved at identifying 
the moments in the conversation when the subject touches upon something that is of interest, 
and in a natural way encourage him or her to elaborate on that. I developed a better sense of 
the reflexive relationship between the interviewee and myself as a researcher in the interview 
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situation, as described by Alvesson and Sköldberg: “There is no one-way street between the 
researcher and the object of study; rather the two affect each other mutually and continually in 
the course of the research process” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 39). 
A third positive consequence of recording is related to language issues. I have some 
Russian skills, but they are limited, and I therefore preferred to conduct the interviews in 
English when possible. Five of the interviews were nonetheless conducted mostly in Russian, 
as the respondents spoke little English. In all these five interviews there was also someone 
who spoke English in close proximity that could assist me when needed1. By listening 
attentively to the interviews and looking up words I did not understand, I discovered points 
that I had missed or misunderstood at the time of the actual interview. The recordings were 
hence valuable to help partially compensate for challenges related to language.  
By to a large degree relying on interviews with employees in human rights NGOs, one 
criticism of this thesis could be that it has a one-sided approach that unjustifiably ignores 
other viewpoints. I argue that this is not a weakness, as the research question is confined to 
focusing on the NGOs’ responses, not on how anyone else observe these responses. The 
phenomenon that I am interested in studying is how Russian human rights NGO adapt in a 
new framework. I seek to provide an explanation of their strategies and map out what parts of 
the framework lead them to follow the kind of strategies they choose to follow. It is by 
studying those that perceive that they experience a phenomenon that we can understand more 
about the consequences of that particular phenomenon (Bækken 2016: 345). By conducting 
most of the interviews with human rights NGO-employees, I rightfully stay within the scope 
of the research question.  
The respondents: Finding, choosing, and getting in touch with them 
An initial interview with Inna Sangadzhieva at the Norwegian Helsinki Committee’s 
(NHC) Russia department in December 2017 was very helpful and provided me with an 
impression of who it might be interesting to try to get an interview with for the purpose of this 
thesis. Making use of the NHC’s expertise and vast contact network in the Russian human 
rights community resulted in all of the nine NGO-interviews that I conducted. Contact was 
mostly established by e-mail and having the opportunity to write that the NHC recommended 
me to get in touch with them may have functioned as a door opener in some cases.  
                                                          
1 In some cases, someone I had brought with me, in other cases a younger employee at the NGO. 
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Interview 2 was obtained through a person who was already in my contact network in 
St Petersburg. I knew he was active in human rights work, so I described my project to him 
and asked for advice on who to interview in order to get the viewpoint of someone that works 
with human rights issues in a less formal way than through an NGO. I explained that I already 
had scheduled interviews with established and professional NGOs, and that I was interested in 
getting in touch with people who had been employed or engaged in human rights NGOs 
before, but who had opted out for the benefit of working without a clear organizational 
structure. This led me to spend an interesting day at a place that functions as a hub for 
different kinds of projects, many of them related to human rights. I conducted one interview 
there with an activist that after a long career in a larger human rights NGO had decided to 
move on to project-based work. 
With the exception of the initial interview with the NHC, all of the interviews were 
conducted with people based in St Petersburg or Moscow. The findings from this study are 
thus not unproblematic to generalize to how NGOs in other parts of Russia respond, 
especially in smaller cities. I chose to do interviews in the two cities because this is where 
most of the well-known human rights NGOs the NHC recommended me to get in touch with 
have their headquarters. All the NGOs are Russian and were founded by Russian citizens. 
This was a criterion I operated with in the selection process, as I wanted to make sure that 
they were not “imported” NGOs. They are relatively well-known and have been in existence 
for quite some time – three of them came into being in the turbulent early 1990s, and the other 
three have a history dating back to the early 2000s. Selecting NGOs that have been active for 
more than a decade was done intentionally. Because I wanted to gain insight into how 
political opportunity structures have changed over time, I wanted to get in touch with NGOs 
with long experience. Preferably I wanted to speak with people who had been working in the 
NGO for as long as possible, and for the most part I managed to get interviews with people 
who had worked there for at least a couple of years and who often had a history of voluntary 
work before getting employed.  
Two of the NGOs were on the foreign agent-list at the time the interviews were 
conducted, two had gone on to other forms of organizing as a result of being named foreign 
agent, one had initially been on the list and had succeeded in its efforts to be removed from 
the list, whereas one had never been on it. All of them have received foreign funding before 
and have had this as a substantial source of their funding, but some stated having stopped 
receiving it. Although all of them describe themselves as working in the sphere of human 
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rights protection, they vary substantially in what explicit field of human rights protection they 
are working in2.  
Another important variable that divided the NGOs are to what degree they can be 
described as service-providing. As discussed in chapter two, theory suggests that competitive 
authoritarian states have strong incentives to applaud NGOs that take on tasks that otherwise 
would eat off scarce government budgets. To be able to understand if “degree of service-
providing” was central to explain how NGOs respond to restrictions and approach 
government, I deliberately got in touch with NGOs that differed on this point so that I could 
compare their answers in light of this feature. 
3.4 Interviews as a useful, necessary and challenging research method in a 
semi-authoritarian setting 
Doing fieldwork in a semi-authoritarian setting implies some ethical and practical 
challenges, and it is essential that the researcher comes up with good strategies for tackling 
potential risks (Gentile 2013: 432). Coping with such challenges is becoming increasingly 
relevant for researchers as states that began transitioning to democracy during the third wave 
are turning towards hybrid forms of authoritarianism. It is therefore problematic that this issue 
is receiving limited attention (Goode 2010: 1055). Goode observes an unfortunate trend: As 
Russia is becoming more authoritarian, political scientists are publishing academic articles on 
Russia where the research questions seem to be less tense and the use of fieldwork as a 
method is declining (ibid.: 1056). 
 
As argued above, conducting interviews with affected NGOs is the most fruitful way 
to obtain reliable data needed to answer the research question in this thesis. The research 
question can be perceived as somewhat political and maybe also provocative. I was therefore 
particularly attentive to planning the fieldwork in a manner that would minimize the risk of 
harm and inconveniences, both for the respondents as well as for myself. With an office space 
at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, I am lucky to be surrounded by researchers with decades of 
experience with conducting academic interviews in Russia. I was advised to do all the 
paperwork one hundred percent honestly and correctly. I was aware that there have been 
instances of researchers losing their visa during fieldwork. On paper, the reason of course is 
that there is some formal mistake in the visa application, but as Håvard Bækken was told 
                                                          
2 See appendix 1 for a description of each NGOs’ main field of work. 
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when he had to cut short the fieldwork for his PhD on selective law enforcement:  “You 
cannot just walk into our country with a sound recorder and pose difficult questions without 
us noticing” (Bækken 2014: 2). Doing fieldwork in semi-authoritarian settings implies more 
often being met with constraints that researchers doing fieldwork in liberal democracies do 
not have to handle. 
 
Goode calls for researchers that do fieldwork in hybrid regimes to explicitly include 
any constraints they meet into their methodological discussions (Goode 2010: 1070). I will 
therefore discuss visa-challenges that I experienced. I got my research visa invitation to 
Russia from the Norwegian University Center in St. Petersburg (DNUSP), which I have had 
several exchange stays at prior to starting the work with this thesis. Shortly after I had 
received my research visa to Russia on the basis of the invitation from DNUSP, the center 
was unexpectedly and with unclear reasons shut down temporarily and put under 
investigation. The students who were there at the time were interrogated by migration 
officers, who told them that the visa invitations DNUSP had provided them with had not been 
valid. The students were then expelled from Russia. At this point I expected that I could not 
use my visa anymore, and that I would either have to get another education institution in 
Russia to provide me with a new invitation or skip going on fieldwork altogether. After 
getting in touch with DNUSP and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was assured 
that my visa would still be valid. Due to the uncertainties concerning the DNUSP situation, I 
chose to postpone the departure with a week. Despite the assurances I was still slightly 
nervous that my visa could cause problems at the border control or during the trip, but 
everything turned out fine. However, three days after I returned from Russia, the board of the 
DNUSP decided to close the center as a result of the last months investigation. 
Scientific closure in regimes drifting towards authoritarianism has consequences for 
the research questions scholars pose, and subsequently the methods used to answer these 
questions (Goode 2016). It is problematic if (as Goode’s evidence points towards) harsher 
conditions for conducting interviews result in political scientists choosing to stay away from 
interesting research puzzles that benefit well from fieldwork. Although researchers doing 
fieldwork in semi-authoritarian settings need to take extra considerations, it is precisely in 
semi-authoritarian regimes that interviews are a well-suited way of obtaining information that 
can be hard or impossible to access via other sources. 
40 
 
The choice to record the interviews may have led the respondents to hold back on 
information they perceive as sensitive or potentially dangerous, and researchers should 
therefore be extra considerate about this the more sensitive the subject they are interested in is 
(Peabody, Hammond et al. 1990: 454). Although I guaranteed full anonymity and that access 
to recordings would be password-protected and limited to myself and my supervisor, they 
may have been concerned about the information somehow getting linked with them anyway. 
Seeing the recorder at the table is a constant visual reminder that everything they say in the 
interview ultimately can be traced back to them. There is undoubtedly a risk that this thought 
crossed the minds of some of the respondents, and that I can have missed valuable 
information due to the choice of recording the interviews. I was conscious about this and tried 
to minimize the risk by taking advantage of the trust-relationship that we built up in the 
course of the interview. Markowitz underlines the opportunities for making use of the more 
informal atmosphere immediately after the interview when doing interviews in an 
authoritarian regime (Markowitz 2016: 903). At the end of each interview I made sure that the 
respondent saw that I turned off my recorder and put it away, and in the more informal 
conversations that often followed I at a couple of occasions experienced that the interviewees 
opened up and spoke more freely than they had done when we were sitting down, and the 
recorder was on. Due to research ethics I have chosen not to use citations of what was said in 
these conversations in the thesis, but these short “by the way”-conversations after the 
interviews gave valuable insight. 
I was invited to a couple of Telegram channels after some of the interviews. Telegram 
is a popular encrypted messaging service in Russia3, and having the opportunity to follow the 
internal group communication prolonged the fieldwork and gave interesting insights into how 
they strategically act to reach their goals.  
All the NGOs are well established, and people with good knowledge of the human 
rights community in Russia may therefore be able to guess who I have spoken with. Re-
identification is a risk, as linking the information gained from the interviews that I present in 
chapter five of this thesis with publicly available information about for example who takes 
part in which bodies possibly can lead to uncovering the identities of some of the NGOs and 
respondents. In hindsight I have the impression that I would have gotten the same answers 
from my respondents irrespective of the choice to anonymize them, and that it would have 
                                                          
3 Telegram was blocked for Russian users in a controversial court order in April 2018, but continues to be 
widely used through VPN-solutions. 
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been a better approach to at least include the names of the NGOs they work in. I can however 
not be completely sure that some of the information disclosed in the interviews was obtained 
due to the promise of complete anonymity. As anonymity was what we agreed upon in the 
interview setting, I have kept this promise throughout the thesis. Gentile underlines that the 
greatest risk of doing research in authoritarian settings is to be unaware of the risks (Gentile 
2013: 432). Keeping the identities of the respondents anonymized is therefore a good 
precautionary strategy when doing fieldwork on sensitive issues in semi-authoritarian 





4 Conditions for civil society in Russia 
 
In order to better understand the opportunity structures for human rights NGOs in 
Russia today, this chapter will provide background information on how civil society and the 
framework it operates under has developed. This chapter seeks to lay the empirical foundation 
that coupled with theory presented in chapter two is necessary for understanding the analysis 
that will be in focus in chapter five. Russia’s last century has been dramatic, and I do not have 
unrealistic ambitions of comprehending all factors that have contributed to shaping civil 
society’s opportunity structures. Running the risk of missing variables in this brief account, I 
do, however, aim to shed sufficient light on the most central factors.  
 
The chapter will start by assessing Russian civil society by relating it to the 
conceptualizations of the term in chapter two. Next, a discussion on how the totalitarian 
legacy has shaped both Russian civil society and the framework it operates in will follow. I 
will move chronologically on to discuss the nineties and the Western democracy assistance to 
NGOs that characterized this period. After that, central issues concerning the governance of 
civil society during the Putin era will be discussed. I will show that while Russian civil 
society including human rights NGOs are definitively severely oppressed in a variety of ways, 
they are far from completely restricted. In some ways they are even encouraged. The 
encouragement has particularly taken the shape of invitations to participate in different 
varieties of deliberative organs. At the end of this chapter, I will describe the organs that are 
most relevant for human rights NGOs. 
 
Recalling the conceptualization of civil society in the beginning of this chapter, how 
does Russian contemporary civil society measure up? Kremlin’s ideal view of civil society 
has been described by Richter as “a coherent, ordered space where individuals assist the state 
in the interest of the whole” (Richter 2009a: 8). This stands in opposition to the 
conceptualizations that emphasize some level of independence from state power. These two 
opposing views of what civil society is conceived to be about are complicated to combine. 
The more classic conceptualization that this thesis aligns with makes seeing civil society as a 
united “whole” difficult to defend. When humans are free to associate and not under strict 
authoritarian limitation, one would expect that civil society will be characterized by diversity. 
To put it simply, people care about different issues and like to spend their time and resources 
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in quite different ways. What, then, is the meaning of “the whole” in this context? The trend 
in establishing government bodies designed to consult with civil society fits well into what is 
known as the doctrine of sovereign democracy (Richter 2009b: 40).  By adding sovereignty in 
front of democracy, one is implying that this way of doing democracy is Russia’s choice and 
not anyone else’s business. Sovereign democracy legitimates a central state while at the same 
time taking into account the fact that today’s world is global and in order to succeed 
economically under these conditions, flexibility and efficiency are mandatory virtues (Richter 
2009b: 40). Consultative organs may facilitate this, while also playing a role in nation-
building for the “whole” of Russian society (Stuvoy 2014: 410).  
4.1 Legacy from totalitarianism 
The breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early nineties opened up opportunities for 
engaging in forms of activity and ways of voicing interests that had been out of the question 
earlier. How have Russians and Russian civil society in the two and a half decades that have 
passed been affected by the legacy of the Soviet Union? Civil society is conceptualized as the 
sphere outside family and state. There is no room for such a sphere in a truly totalitarian 
society. A totalitarian past, and in particular a totalitarian communist past, is correlated with 
challenges in developing a vibrant civil society when states turn democratic (Goncharov and 
Shirikov 2013: 29). One study has found that while citizens of newly democratized states with 
a totalitarian past on average have 1.82 organizational memberships each, this number drops 
to 0.91 for the citizens of post-communist states (Petrova and Tarrow 2007: 76). It would, 
however, be a misguided oversimplification to assume that all causes of Russia’s present 
rather weak civil society are to be found in its communist past. There are prominent 
differences in strength amongst the European post-communist countries’ civil societies 
(Howard 2002: 158). These differences make it problematic to blame the Soviet past alone for 
Russia’s weak civil society. Some therefore look further back and point to decades of tsarism 
as central to understanding Russia’s low levels of associational activity (Henderson 2003: 17). 
 
This being said, it is hard to get away from the fact that the legacy of the Soviet era 
continues to have a lasting impact on Russian civil society. The state monopoly on all things 
related to public life resulted in a population skeptical towards participating voluntarily in 
organizations (Richter 2009a: 9). Building and developing civil society is a challenging task 
and it does not get easier when the population has recent and good reasons for being skeptical 
to state action on this field. Howard finds that mistrust of communist organizations results in 
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long-lasting reluctance to join organizations. After decades of mandatory participation, people 
are not particularly eager to engage in activities that resemble what they once had to take part 
in involuntarily (Howard 2002: 161). 
 
4.2 The wild 90s: The age of democracy assistance 
To Yeltsin, building civil society was never high on the agenda. The legal framework 
for governing civil society and the rights and activities of NGOs was often understood quite 
differently across the regions due to complexity and poor communication (Henderson 2011: 
15). His number one priority was reforming the economic system, particularly in the first few 
years. In this way, the immediate post-soviet Russia fits Fukuyama’s description, which 
categorizes building social capital as a “second-generation” economic reform (Fukuyama 
2001: 7). One explanation for the low level of attention towards civil society is the lack of 
resources that Russia suffered following the breakdown of the Soviet Union – other tasks 
seemed to simply have to come first. Another explanation is that there was a belief in the elite 
that as long as the totalitarian regime was gone, civil society would flourish on its own.  
Still, the very phenomenon of public consultative structures with the goal of building 
dialogue between civil society and the authorities can be traced back to Yeltsin. It was his 
administration that in 1994 proposed that all regional governments should set up public 
chambers as a meeting place where relevant actors and NGOs could participate in discussing 
issues and legislation that the regional dumas were about to process (Henderson 2011: 17). 
The 1995 Federal Law No. 7 on Non-profit Organisations was the first coherent attempt to set 
up a legal framework governing Russian NGOs, and this law remains active today. The 
development in number of amendments to the law reflects a noteworthy increase in 
government attention towards civil society: While the law was amended five times the first 
decade it was active, the next decade saw a rush resulting in a total of 74 amendments as of 
2016 (Skokova 2016: 130). 
  For the most part, then, civil society was left to develop on its own without neither 
restrictions nor help from above. The Yeltsin era’s lax attitude with regard to civil society 
facilitated the surge of Western democracy assistance programs focusing on building Russian 
NGOs. In the absence of domestic initiative and steering, different democracy assistance 
initiatives from abroad provided funding opportunities as well as training workshops and 
education programs for emerging Russian civil society organizations. Henderson refers to the 
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resulting situation as unintended clientelism, with unequal vertical relationships between the 
foreign funders and the Russian NGOs (Henderson 2003: 28). She suggests that this has led to 
a lack of connection between NGOs and the people they claim to represent.  A lack of 
connection between NGOs and ordinary people can make introducing restrictions easier to 
justify for authoritarians (Rekosh 2017: 71). 
 
4.3 Putin period – new restrictions and new opportunities 
 
“Putin appears to have been haunted by fear of systemic breakdown and the potential for 
democratic failure” (Sakwa 2015: 193). 
Throughout the Putin presidencies,  the implementation of measures designed to allow 
stricter control of NGOs has coincided with the creation of more opportunities for civil 
society to voice issues through new institutions designed for this purpose (Daucé 2014: 243). 
Instruments of co-optation have in other words been implemented alongside instruments of 
coercion. Changes in governing civil society and legislation with consequences for NGOs in 
Russia during Putin’s presidencies can be divided into two waves: The first one in 2005-2006 
and the second one following the presidential election in 2012 (Van Der Vet and Lyytikäinen 
2015: 981). While Putin’s first presidential period from 2000 to 2004 followed in Yeltsin’s 
footsteps with regard to the relaxed approach to civil society, this took a turn in his second 
presidential period. Beginning in 2004, it was marked by extensive reforms concerning how 
the state governs civil society.  
The reforms resulted in a landscape less friendly towards NGOs with interests that are 
perceived as threatening to the state, whereas non-political NGOs or NGOs with interests that 
align with the state’s interests are applauded (Robertson 2009: 531). The changes introduced 
restrictions on amongst other things who may create an organization in Russia, strengthened 
the state’s right to oversight over NGO activities as well as specifying what may lead an NGO 
to be denied registration (Henderson 2011: 20).  
These steps led Russia closer to what some call “managed democracy”, where the 
political components are kept at an arm’s length in order to control contestation and avoid the 
dangers genuine democracy poses to political power (Sakwa 2015: 193-194). The new 
regulations were motivated by a desire to safeguard Russia against foreign influence through 
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domestic civil society (Crotty, Hall et al. 2014: 1262), and designed to reshape the costs of 
organization for NGOs that were possible threats (Horvath 2011). For example, one reason for 
being denied registration starting from 2006 was if the NGO’s “goals and objectives […] 
create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, 
unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation” 
(Henderson 2011: 20). From this point on Russia’s national interest was presented as clashing 
with Western democratization efforts – a development that has become increasingly clear. By 
creating a different set of rules for the parts of civil society that can be described as having a 
political component, the authorities aim at keeping the status quo (Van Der Vet and 
Lyytikäinen 2015: 981).  
How did foreign-supported NGOs become an alleged threat to Russian authorities, and 
have they really ever had the goal or potential to pose a risk to the regime? What is known as 
the color revolutions in the neighboring countries in the early and mid-2000s were game 
changers concerning how threatening civil society forces were perceived to be by the 
Kremlin. The Rose revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 
and the Tulip revolution in Kirgizstan in 2005 powerfully demonstrated that authoritarian 
leaders of the post-communist states could be overthrown when citizens are mobilized and 
take to the streets in protest (Robertson 2009: 529-532). Parts of the movements behind the 
protests that culminated with the revolutions had received financial and educational support 
from Western democracy support initiatives. Support came from amongst others American 
groups such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, 
Freedom House and the Open-Society Institute (Carothers 2006: 55-56).  The same groups 
have also been central contributors to Russian NGOs. This support tended to focus on 
building NGOs. Finding efficient ways of controlling foreign support to NGOs thus became a 
key concern for preventing color revolutions. For this reason, Ron et al. classify foreign aid as 
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for when states choose to crack down on locally 
operating NGOs that rely on foreign funding (Ron, Kaire et al. 2018: 153).   
 
Furthermore, restrictions on forming NGOs have been presented as anti-terrorism 
measures, a framing that domestic NGOs have protested and perceived as a strawman 
argument (Gershman and Allen 2006: 40). In Russia’s case, the first wave of restrictions was 
initiated shortly after the 2004 Beslan school hostage terrorist attack, and the new restrictions 
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were presented as a part of a legitimate and larger strategy to avoid future attacks (Richter 
2009b: 39). 
 
When Putin returned for his third presidential term in 2012, a second wave of 
restrictions took form. The Ukraine conflict beginning in 2014 further accelerated the 
government’s tightening control over anything resembling opposition in Russia (Gel'Man 
2015: 187). The implementation of the law on foreign agents and subsequently the law on 
undesirable organizations contributed to restrict opportunities to access foreign resources. 
 
4.4 Foreign agents and undesirable organizations 
The foreign agent law bears much of the responsibility of the closing space for civil 
society in Russia. The federal law was passed in 2012 and states that any NGO needs to 
register with the Ministry of Justice as a foreign agent if it is a: 
Russian non-profit organization that receives financial resources or other goods from 
foreign states, their agencies, international or foreign organizations, foreign citizens, 
stateless persons or their representatives, or from Russian organizations receiving 
funds from those sources, and which takes part, particularly in the interests of foreign 
personalities, in political activity within the territory of the Russian Federation (Daucé 
2014: 247).  
The law focuses on two aspects: Foreign funding and political activity. The law does 
not specify any minimum threshold for amount of funding, so in principle a very low amount 
is sufficient to become a foreign agent (NGO-Lawyers'-Club 2016: 3) Furthermore, the law’s 
conceptualization of “political activity” is extremely vague, as it is specified to mean:  
[..] organizing and implementing political actions aimed at influencing the decision-
making by state bodies intended for the change of state policy pursued by them, as 
well as in the shaping of public opinion for the above mentioned purposes (Van Der 
Vet and Lyytikäinen 2015: 982).  
It remains unclear where the limits to what constitutes attempts at influencing 
decision-making are drawn. By including also attempts at shaping public opinion, practically 
every NGO working with human rights issues will have a hard time escaping a strict 
understanding of the law. This is reflected in the large proportion of human rights NGOs that 
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are listed in the foreign agent-registry today; About one-fourth of the NGOs in the registry are 
working in the sphere of human rights (Flikke 2018: 27). Despite this, not every human rights 
NGO in Russia receiving foreign funding has yet been placed in the foreign agent-registry.  
The vagueness of the law’s conceptualization of political activity creates favorable 
conditions for selective law enforcement. Bækken points out that “when selective law 
enforcement takes place, informal criteria constitute the only or primary reason for a selection 
– and thus also the main reason for legal procedures to be initiated” (Bækken 2014: 57-58). In 
the beginning, it was especially unclear what exactly the practical consequences of being on 
the list would be, and as chapter five will explore, this has marked how NGOs in the danger 
zone have responded to it. 
As of March 2018, the Ministry of Justice had labeled 158 NGOs as foreign agents since 
2014, and out of these 79 are still in the registry whereas a little more than 20 have succeeded 
in deregistering (HRW.org, accessed 27.04.2018) The rest of the NGOs have either stopped 
operating or found new ways to work in that allow them to escape the label.  
In addition to the foreign agent law, the law on undesirable organizations was 
implemented in 2015. One significant difference from the foreign agent law is that it only 
applies to foreign organizations, and domestic organizations are thus not directly affected by 
it. The law empowers the Prosecutor’s Office to declare foreign and international 
organizations undesirable and hence expel them from operating in Russia, if they are 
considered to “[…] threaten the foundation of the constitutional order of the Russian 
Federation, the country’s defense capability, or the security of the state” (ICNL 2016: 16). As 
all NGOs interviewed for this thesis are Russian and have been Russian since they started 
operating, they cannot be declared “undesirable” by the law as it is today. However, the law 
on undesirable organizations also opens for punishing Russian citizens with up to six years in 
prison for having close ties with such organizations (HRW 2017: 16) 
The foreign agent law serves to restrict NGOs on two levels. Firstly, those NGOs who 
already have been labeled foreign agents face a number of difficulties, such as a heavier 
workload due to increased demands about reporting as well as the more difficult working 
conditions that comes with the stigmatizing label. Secondly, fear of ending up as a foreign 
agent may cause NGOs to take precautions and act differently from what they otherwise 
would do. In 2014, the Ministry of Justice was granted the right to enlist NGOs as foreign 
agents, and NGOs that fail to enlist themselves before the Ministry of Justice evaluates them 
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to fit in the foreign agent category are required to pay high fines. In some cases, dissolution of 
the NGO and even imprisonment can be the consequences (Flikke 2016: 103). The fines can 
be high enough to be synonymous with dissolution. 
Upon being appointed as National Ombudsman for human rights in Russia, former police 
officer Tatiana Moskalkova announced that she sees her goal as:  
[…] Strengthening the authority of the National Ombudsman in the international 
arena. It is essential because recently the human rights issue has been used quite 
actively by some Western and American structures as a tool for blackmail, 
speculation, threats and attempts of putting pressure on Russia. And the National 
Ombudsman can and should stand up against false, unsubstantiated accusations 
aimed at Russia. (NGO-Lawyers'-Club 2016: 40, my emphasis on used) 
 Moskalkova’s statement invites to a semantic discussion of what connotations the 
words inostranniy agent - foreign agent - bring up in Russian. Both in the academic literature 
as well as in Western news coverage, the term is often framed as having a particularly bad 
smell to it in Russian language. For example,  Sakwa claims that: “[…] the term in Russian 
unequivocally suggests working in the interests of foreign powers (in other words, a ‘spy’)” 
(Sakwa 2015: 202). In a similar fashion, Flikke refers to the label as having “[…] exclusively 
negative connotations in Russian” (Flikke 2016: 112), while Human Rights Watch writes that 
the term in Russian “[…] can be interpreted by the public only as “spy” or “traitor”” 
(HRW.org, accessed 27.04.2018). 
I want to shed light on an alternative interpretation here. Berkov’s Russian-Norwegian 
dictionary lists middle man4 as one meaning of the word “agent” in Russian. In Russian the 
more common word for spy is razvedchik. “Agent” in Russian can be understood in this sense 
as well, but by overlooking the middle man-meaning we risk losing sight of some interesting 
aspects. I propose that this seemingly small but important semantic discrepancy often gets lost 
in translation.  This is problematic for several reasons. The middle man-meaning allows for an 
interpretation of the term that implies that the agent is being used, which is similar to what 
Moskalkova described that she would like to work to prevent in the citation above. In a 
meeting with FSB in 2015, Putin used the term in a similar vein, when he informed the 
security service that he would not engage in dialogue with those who receive funding from 
                                                          
4 Thanks to Arild Moe for making me aware of this meaning of the word. 
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abroad, as “it is pointless to enter into discussions with those who have orders from outside 
and interests of not their own, but of a foreign country” (lenta.ru 2015). To sum up, 
understanding agent as in part meaning middle man can somewhat soften the stigmatizing 
impression of the term foreign agent that Sakwa and Flikke present.   
 
USAID every year presents a report on civil society in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia, where they evaluate and measure the development of the legal environment for civil 
society organizations. The figure below on legal environment for Russian civil society 
organizations comes from the last available report from 2017 (USAID 2017: 199). It provides 
a visual representation of the development discussed so far in this chapter, where the two 
waves of restrictions starting in 2005 and 2012 are recognizable.  
 
Figure 2 Legal Environment for NGOs in Russia. (USAID 2017: 179) 
 
Sakwa describes Russia today as in a constant process of negotiation with society 
(Sakwa 2015: 194), fueled by the motivation to ensure stability. If this balance strategy is to 
be successful, implementing too harsh strategies when dealing with NGOs is an inexpedient 
tactic. Daucé suggests that fruitful negotiation calls for a “softer” approach, as depolitization 
of sensitive issues becomes key to stability (Daucé 2014). Bækken notes that low-intensity 
coercion is a strategy that increasingly is embraced by competitive authoritarian regimes, 
including Russia (Bækken 2014: 48). The idea here is that by increasing the NGOs’ level of 
inconvenience associated with their daily work, they can be coerced to stay away from issues 
that are potentially harming to the regime. Russian NGOs that are concerned with issues 
related to democracy and human rights operate under dramatically harsher conditions than 
those who work on less political and social service-oriented issues (USAID 2017: 4) – not 
only because they by law are under stricter limitations, but also as Bækken’s research 
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suggests because they are more likely to become the objects of a selective interpretation of 
these laws. 
4.5 Deliberative organs and oversight organs with relevance for human 
rights NGOs 
According to theory presented in chapter two, competitive authoritarian regimes have 
good reasons to limit NGOs opportunities to engage in “naming and shaming”, and the 
foreign agent law and the law on undesirable organizations are Russian examples of how the 
authorities aim at that.  Deliberative organs, on the other hand, allow authorities to become 
“users of civil society” instead.  
In the West, media tend to interpret the introduction of restrictions on NGOs to mean 
that the Putin regime is opposed to civil society in general, and would like to see civic 
engagement at a minimum (Owen 2017: 381). While the conditions for civil society without a 
doubt on a range of areas have gotten tighter, I argue that an uncritical conceptualization of 
the development in Russia as “crackdown on civil society” allows for a too narrow 
understanding of the ways in which the Putin regime governs civil society. Looking closer, 
the authorities have actually increased its encouragement of certain forms of civic 
engagement. As Putin declared at a meeting with the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi: 
 
We need a civil society, but it must be permeated by patriotism, concern for one’s 
country, and should do things not for money but from the heart, eager to put right 
those problems that we indeed have and do this, I repeat, not for money but as the 
heart dictates. (Putin quoted in Henderson 2011: 19) 
 
In line with this, several measures have been taken to support the development of a 
domestic civil society. Some of these measures can be seen as part of the closing space 
phenomenon. In chapter two, it was established that creating alternative civic actors is a 
recurring strategy that competitive authoritarian regimes use to curb existing civic actors. 
Supporting groups like Nashi is an example of how Russia builds up loyal parts of civil 
society.  
Measures that aim to co-opt civil society are a related strategy, but it is problematic to 
view them as part of the closing space-phenomenon as also more critical NGOs are invited to 
participate. The last fifteen years, Russia has seen a significant increase in the number and use 
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of consultative organs and control organs where civil society actors are prescribed a central 
role: 
Public oversight is being increasingly approached as a platform for dialogue between 
civil society and public authorities. By encouraging search for solutions to social 
problems public oversight provides rise of both civil activism and social responsibility 
(oprf.ru).  
Consultative organs can function as useful tools for both human rights activists and the 
authorities, although their motivation for taking part in consultative structures differ. As 
explored in the theory chapter, competitive authoritarian regimes have much to gain from 
developing well-functioning negotiation arenas with civil society because issues can be 
handled in a controlled manner before they become too big. Sakwa presents this as a form of 
information triangulation: 
Through endless opinion monitoring and policy ‘triangulation’ of the Clintonesque 
sort, the regime tries to avert political crises. In the Russian context, triangulation 
operates within a type of corporative consultative regime in which key stakeholders 
are kept within the ruling consensus (Sakwa 2015: 194).  
This thesis aims to investigate how Russian human rights NGOs who are otherwise 
under different degrees of restrictions handle the opportunity to take part in this triangulation 
process.  Owen (2017) identifies two discourses that are present in Russia today: On one 
hand, to critical parts of civil society the consultative structures can open up new and valuable 
opportunities for effectively exercising the role as watchdog. Having the opportunity to 
participate in a multitude of channels for direct communication with decision makers that you 
want to influence can however put even the most critical watchdog in a dilemma: Is 
participation in these forums a form of resistance or in the end a form of compliance? For on 
the other hand, the authorities can use consultative structures to enhance quality of 
governance by getting access to information that otherwise would be hard to gain. Richter 
(2009a: 8) touches upon this dilemma when he argues that starting from Putin’s second 
presidential term, Russia “has appropriated the rhetoric of civil society to elicit the civic 
participation necessary to improve state governance and to construct boundaries around the 
public sphere to preserve state sovereignty”. In this second scenario, the parts of civil society 
that choose to take part in consultative meeting places function as willing assistants to ensure 
stability for the current regime: By taking part, they to some degree help legitimize it. 
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There is a wide variety of arenas where different levels of government and civil 
society actors can meet and consult in Russia today. For example, every ministry is required 
to have a public council to advise them (USAID 2017: 204-205). I have singled out three 
permanent organs for specific investigation in this thesis because they are well-known and 
relevant for a broad range of human rights NGOs. These are the Civic Chamber on regional 
and federal level, prison observer commissions (ONK), and the Presidential Council for Civil 
Society and Human Rights. While they share similarities concerning working sphere (human 
rights) and established-ness, they differ substantially from one another in that they perform 
different functions. These three represent the broad diversity in ways of mediating with civil 
society, with purposes ranging from discussing upcoming law proposals to the Duma and 
monitor the implementation of these, inspecting human rights conditions for people in prison, 
to giving advice directly to the president himself. These will be given short introductions 
below since background information about these structures is crucial to a good understanding 
of next chapter’s analysis of NGO strategies.  
The Civic Chambers on regional and federal level 
In 1994 during Yeltsin’s presidency, regional governors in Russia were required to 
establish civic chambers where representatives from civil society and the authorities can meet 
and discuss issues of interest (Owen 2017: 382). After Beslan in 2004, Putin followed up on 
this, and created a federal Civic Chamber (Richter 2009b: 39) According to its website, the 
federal Civic Chamber’s purpose today is to act as “a bridge between the Russian 
Federation’s decision-making institutions and the Russian Federation’s citizens” by: 
[helping] citizens interact with government officials and local authorities in order to 
take into account the needs and interests of citizens, to protect their rights and 
freedoms in the process of shaping and implementing state policies, and to exercise 
public control over the activities of executive authorities (oprf.ru: accessed 
26.03.2018). 
This powerful self-description made me expect that human rights NGOs would view 
the Civic Chamber as a place to seek representation, but as the next chapter will show, they 
did interestingly not perceive the Civic Chambers as relevant places to be represented. The 
Civic Chamber is also responsible for distributing governmental grants to NGOs, and this 
administration process has received criticism for lacking transparency and for favoring 
Moscow-based NGOs (Crotty, Hall et al. 2014: 1257) .  
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The 168 members of the federal Civic Chamber are elected every third year through an 
intricate three-step process that aims at ensuring both a certain amount of pluralism as well as 
minimizing the risk of ending up with a chamber that is too eager to challenge the status quo. 
This is achieved by first electing 40 representatives through an executive order from the 
president. Then the regional Civic Chambers contribute by appointing 83 members. Finally, 
the last 43 representatives are recommended by national public associations, who has to be 
approved by the two other groups (oprf.ru, accessed 10.05.2018).  
The ONK - State-initiated public watchdog committees 
In 2008 the Federal Law “On Public Oversight of Human Rights in Places of 
Detention and Assistance to Persons in Places of Detention” laid the legal framework for a 
new form of oversight that closely involves civil society. Concretely, this resulted in the 
formation of prison monitoring committees, in Russian called the Obshchestvennye 
Nablyudatelnye Kommissii (ONK) in each of Russia’s regions. These public watchdog 
committees depending on the size of the region consist of between 5 to 40 members that are 
given extensive rights to access places of detention and speak directly with detainees in order 
to uncover unlawful cases where human rights have been put aside. The law gave the Civic 
Chamber the responsibility of coordinating the work on setting up the ONKs throughout 
Russia. It is telling that this responsibility was delegated to a consultative organ that to a large 
degree itself is made up of representatives from civil society. Although, as discussed in the 
last section, the election process of the Civic Chamber members is designed to leave out 
voices that are too critical, leaving this responsibility to the Civic Chamber is to go one step 
further in including civil society in monitoring. The Civic Chamber itself frames being given 
this task as a sign of trust and proof of its performance efficiency (oprf.ru, accessed 
27.04.2018).  The regional Civic Chambers that are charged with assessing the nominations to 
the ONKs and appoint members. 
The Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (PCHRCS) 
The PCHRCS meets directly with Putin on an annual basis. Its history dates back to 
when it was operating as a commission on human rights for Yeltsin from 1993, before getting 
reorganized into the Council in 2004 when Putin seriously started to rethink the state’s 
approach to domestic civil society (president-sovet.ru, accessed 27.03.2018). The council is in 
a special position as a significant portion of its former and current members are quite 
outspoken critics of President Putin, the man the council is giving advice to.  As a matter of 
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fact, several of its members hold leading positions in NGOs that have been registered as 
foreign agents by the Ministry of Justice and hence on a daily basis experience the difficulties 
that follow with carrying this label.  
The PCHRCS is tasked with being: 
A consultative body established to assist the President in the exercise of his 
constitutional responsibilities to guarantee and protect human rights and freedoms, 
keep the President informed on the situation in this area, facilitate development of 
civil society institutions in Russia, and draft proposals for the President on matters 
within its mandate (Kremlin.ru: accessed 12.04.2018). 
In dealing with the council, Putin has repeatedly used rhetoric that fits well with 
compensating for what Schedler (2013: 68) refers to as the institutional uncertainties that 
competitive authoritarian regimes are extra vulnerable to. A recent example comes from a 
session with the PCHRCS in 2017, when Putin regarded deliberation with civil society in this 
way:  
The state authorities and civil society are natural allies in achieving these common 
goals, the most important of which is our people’s prosperity. A constructive, 
substantive and respectful dialogue between the authorities at the various levels 
and civil society representatives is always needed and is without question very useful 
(Kremlin.ru: accessed 12.12.2017). 
4.6 Summed up  
This chapter has discussed the legal framework for civil society from the nineties and 
up until today. The lasting influence of a totalitarian communist past combined with Western 
civil society support focusing on NGOs was underlined as important factors explaining the 
opportunities NGOs are left with in Russia today.  
How, then, do the NGOs perceive their shrinking working conditions? Figure 3 below 
shows the distribution of responses to the question “How do you evaluate the context 
conditions for your civil society organization (CSO) with regard to legal framework, 
financing, private donations, public opinion, state support, volunteering and media coverage?” 




Figure 3 Context conditions as perceived by civil society organizations. (N=192) 
 
Figure 3 shows that there are substantial differences concerning the different types of 
contexts. The relatively positive evaluations regarding the conditions of volunteering, public 
opinion and private donations calls for exploring what types of strategies NGOs develop in 
these fields.      
As Russia is a competitive authoritarian regime, it will be rational for the rulers to 
limit the political potential of civil society. While the regime may want to improve 
governance by building civil society, securing power by limiting civil society’s potential to 
create destabilizing situations will always be priority number one. Deliberative organs can 
play an important role in discovering destabilizing issues before they become dangerous. The 
lack of formal power that characterizes all these organs at the same time ensures that they will 
not turn into threatening executive bodies.  As the Civic Chamber stresses in a 2017 report: 
Resolutions of public councils, chambers, and commissions are perceived as a 
recommendation only, there is no adequate mechanism for authorities to effectively 
respond to the requests from public organizations and initiative groups coming in the 
form of resolutions passed during their meetings (OPRF 2017: 16). 
Where chapter two outlined how theory suggests that civil society forces may both 
pose a challenge but also be beneficial for the authorities in competitive authoritarian regimes, 
this chapter has shed light on how a wish to uphold the balance between these two contrasting 
considerations has resulted in a legal and economic framework for Russian human rights 
NGOs that is both repressive but paradoxically at the same time embraces state-civil society 
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cooperation. Flikke in a similar vein argues that the framework governing Russian civil 
society today is “a system of stigmatization and co-optation” (Flikke 2016: 104). After having 
traced the development of the opportunity structures for Russian human rights NGOs starting 
from the early nineties up until today and looked closer at the most central institutions for co-
optation, I conclude this chapter by agreeing with Flikke’s assessment in broad terms and add 
that it is important to take into account the ways NGOs can benefit from co-optative measures 
when assessing their opportunity structures. The stage is now set to ask in what ways NGOs 





5 The analysis: Human rights NGOs’ strategies in new 
waters 
 
Based in a review of the theoretical literature, chapter two presented some strategies 
that NGOs are expected to respond with when finding themselves in closing space. I now 
return to these to help me answer the research question: In what ways do Russian human 
rights NGOs respond to new restrictions, and why and how do they participate in co-optation 
efforts from the state? The strategies are summarized as hypotheses in the table below, where 
they are accompanied by the factors related to closing and opening of civic space that are 
assumed to shape the responses.   
Closing/ Opening space Expected response 
Closing space: 
• Sweeping laws targeting NGOs 
• Selective law enforcement 
H1: NGOs will search for alternative ways of 
structuring themselves. 
Closing space: 
• Divide-and-conquer strategies 
H2: Different actors in civil society will forge 
alliances and cooperate in ways that make the 
most out of their diverse organizational forms. 
Closing space: 
• Delegitimization of civil society 
H3: NGOs will increase their efforts to build a 
domestic base of supporters and reframe their 
issues to become attractive to the broader layers of 
the population.  
Closing space: 
• Restrictions on foreign funding. 
Opening space: 
• New sources of domestic funding. 
H4: NGOs will seek to diversify their sources of 
funding and look for domestic funding 
opportunities when foreign funding is restricted. 
 
Closing space: 
• Alternative civic actors take over. 
Opening space:  
• New opportunities to take part in 
deliberative organs. 
H5:  NGOs will embrace the opportunities they 
are left with and therefore choose to participate 




5.1 New organizational forms 
H1: NGOs will search for alternative ways of structuring themselves.  
This section will discuss which organizational changes the respondents’ NGOs have 
done or consider doing to avoid being affected by restrictions targeting NGOs specifically, 
such as the foreign agent law. Chapter two argued that NGOs finding themselves vulnerable 
to restrictions will respond by searching for alternative ways of structuring themselves, and 
that both becoming more formal and becoming less formal are viable options. The 
respondents seemed to prefer going the more informal way, and several underlined that this 
was because “organizations are easier to oppress” (Interview 2). One respondent put it this 
way: 
In Russia it is really hard to know what will happen, […] it is always the possibility 
[of] a new law - the informal structure is more useful and it’s harder to restrict 
(Interview 6).         
 
In a 2017 report, the federal Civic Chamber claims that the foreign agent-law as it is 
today “encourages the establishment of holding companies, where one organization deals with 
politics and is funded with Russian money, and the other deals with foreign money and is out 
of politics.” (OPRF 2017: 28). NGO 4 had tried this strategy, but with limited success. When 
they first were added to the foreign agent-registry, they closed down the NGO and started 
operating again as a new one with the same mission and the same leadership. However, this 
time the employees’ salaries were payed through another organization (which dealt with the 
financial part of the organization) in order to avoid accusations of receiving foreign funding. 
This was soon discovered, and they were once again named foreign agent. The search for an 
organizational form that works well have since been a big issue for them: 
 
We have changed our legal body, our name, a couple of times. Now, I guess it's the 4th 
or 5th legal entity that we have, and we have not been recognized as a foreign agent 
by the Ministry of Justice.  […] We are now obshchestvennoe dvizhenie - social 
movement - and we're not an interregional NGO now technically, although we are in 
substance. [Social movements are] not registered by the Ministry of Justice, so they do 




This goes to show that how restriction of human rights NGOs takes place is a constant 
learning by doing-game, both for the state and affected NGOs. NGOs are finding and testing 
legal loopholes and setting precedents for what is possible and what is not possible. When 
they find something that works, they settle for it as long as it works.  
NGO 2 has also chosen to go the more informal way. They first objected to being 
named foreign agent and took the decision to court without succeeding. Now they work as 
what the respondent referred to as “an informal association” without any legal entity 
(Interview 6). They reported that they recently had been informally approached by the 
authorities and had been given advice on how to get excluded from the foreign agent-registry. 
However, NGO 2 had responded by saying no thanks to returning to their old organizational 
form: “We decided that we did not need it, because we have [new name] now and it is really 
okay to work this way” (Interview 6). 
While some NGOs, like NGO 2 and NGO 4 referred to above, have become adept at 
finding temporary organizational forms that for a while allow them to continue their work 
with a minimum of restrictions, others are reluctant for various reasons. One example is from 
an NGO that has not been named foreign agent yet, but is in the process of making back-up 
plans in case it becomes an issue: 
I think for us maybe it is ok to close [NGO’s name] and start a new NGO, but well, 
when you think about it, we have done almost 30 years work here, so there's that 
(Interview 7). 
For them, the brand value of their established name and good reputation is an 
important factor. They want to respond to restrictions in a way that will not jeopardize their 
good reputation. Although my sample of six NGOs - including three that were founded in the 
early nineties and three from the early-mid 2000s - is small, an interesting tendency that 
divides the sample can be detected. The overall trend is that the NGOs that date back to the 
early nineties are more anxious about keeping their current name and the organizational form 
they are used to than the NGOs established from the early-to-mid 2000s seem to be. NGO 1 is 
an example of an older NGOs’ thinking. They stated preserving their legitimacy as a reason 
for why they were eager to get rid of the foreign agent-label. They made a big sacrifice by 




After a year, we applied to get excluded from the registry, although there were no set 
procedures to do this, meaning the law does not specify how to do that. 
So the Ministry of Justice did a new inspection (proverka), and they recommended not 
to remove us from the registry as [they] found traces of foreign funding, as some of 
our co-workers work in other NGOs, and these receive foreign funding. We did not 
agree with this decision and complained to a higher level in the Ministry of Justice. 
Our complaint was heard, surprisingly. And without any reason given, we received the 
news about us being removed from the registry of foreign agents from mass media 
(Interview 4).   
 
Coincidentally, the nineties-NGOs were also the ones that had the most interaction 
with the public, due to their work involving different categories of service providing. NGO 3 
is not a foreign agent, despite receiving foreign funding and working to influence policy in the 
field of rights and living conditions for homeless people. They also provide a range of 
services for homeless people, such as shelters. This is something that eases the burden of the 
state, and they are thus allowed to continue as a “normal” NGO even though they could be 
argued to fulfill the functions of a foreign agent as stated in the law. 
Summing up, some NGOs are as H1 suggests responding to restrictions by adapting 
new organizational forms, in particular informal arrangements. Some succeed and thrive in 
the cat-and-mouse game of finding legal loopholes. However, H1 needs modifying, as NGOs 
with much interaction with the public are keen to keep their way of doing things because it is 
important to them to preserve legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
5.2 Developing alliances  
H2: Different actors in civil society will forge alliances and cooperate in ways that make 
the most out of their diverse organizational forms. 
The human rights communities in St Petersburg and Moscow are not that big, and 
consequently, professionals who work in the sphere are not strangers to one another. As one 
respondent from a St Petersburg-based NGO emphasized:  
It is [a] really close community and everyone knows each other, and we have a lot of 
projects together. […] We have contact in a human way because everyone knows each 
other” (Interview 6) 
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This is in line with what the respondent who was most critical to cooperating with 
government reported. The respondent in question opted out of working as an employee in 
NGOs because “organizations are easier to oppress” (Interview 2). Now she has a central role 
in an activist building that houses different projects and initiatives. Despite criticizing the 
PCHRCS for being a place where nothing happens, this activist also underlines that she has 
built an extensive personal network as a result of long experience in the Russian human rights 
community, starting from the nineties: 
If I personally approach members of the council [that she knows], then we can agree 
on something. If I explain why it is important, they will do it. But if it is not me, but 
someone else who doesn't know the member, that makes the proposal, then it could of 
course work… But in reality not. So I can use it like an instrument. (Interview 2) 
This is similar to the development towards surreptitious symbiosis, as described by 
Glasius and Ishkanian (2015). Like the authors’ wildly different activists from Yerevan, 
London, Cairo and Athens, my respondent argued that their loose form of organizing is 
beneficial because it allows them to stay “truer” to their cause than what professional NGOs 
can. Although “their activities are taking a more institutional shape, […] they [argue that 
they] are creating alternative spaces as well as new practices and forms of organizing which 
preserve the ideational logic” (Glasius and Ishkanian 2015: 2624). Understanding the logic of 
the behind-the-scenes relationship between loosely organized activists and professionalized 
NGOs as a form of response to shrinking space in civil society opens up to looking for 
patterns of contact between them. 
H2 finds support, as personal relationships can be central in enhancing solidarity and 
understanding between different actors in Russian civil society. The ways in which networks 
can be used with regard to voicing issues through deliberative bodies will be discussed further 
in the analysis. 
 
5.3 Building a domestic base of supporters 
H3: NGOs will increase their efforts to build a domestic base of supporters and reframe 
their issues to become attractive to the broader layers of the population.  
Something that clearly distinguishes the conditions of current-day competitive 
authoritarian regimes from that of their totalitarian predecessors, is the modern world’s instant 
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and easy access to information. With internet on smartphones in everyone’s pockets, limiting 
what kind of information is spread and how it is spread has become quite a different challenge 
than it was during Soviet times. Like activists elsewhere, Russian human rights activists use 
social media actively to spread their message. Even if they lack a cohesive communications 
strategy, most NGOs in Russia are active on popular social media platforms (USAID 2017: 
209).  
 Russia has been cautious to limit freedom of speech online. Other authoritarian 
regimes like China have gone to great lengths to control what people can access online, and 
hence also how NGOs can communicate with the public. Russia has chosen a different 
approach and has mostly avoided blocking web pages. The web pages of all the NGOs that I 
interviewed can be accessed with a Russian IP-address. Those who are in the foreign agent-
registry are by law required to state this on every tab of their web page, and if they fail to do 
so they will be heavily fined (Interview 11). Although limited less so than other authoritarian 
regimes, Russia has by no means stayed away from attempts at controlling the internet 
altogether. As part of the second wave of restrictions against civil society beginning with 
Putin’s return to the presidency, the crackdown on NGOs is increasingly spreading to 
restricting actions online (HRW 2017: 1), with consequences for ordinary people as well as 
NGOs. In 2012, Roskomnadzor, the Russian Service for Supervision of Communications, 
Information Technology and Mass Media, was charged with maintaining a central registry of 
blocked material online (HRW 2017: 18). Recent developments give reason to believe that 
Russia is moving towards a more controlling approach concerning internet access. From 2011 
and up until 2014, Freedom House rated Russia as “partly free” with regard to freedom on the 
internet. This evaluation was changed to “not free” in 2015, and the same conclusion was 
reached again in 2016 and 2017 (Freedom House 2017).  Legislation now demands that any 
social media platform needs to store information about its Russian users on Russian territory. 
On other occasions, anti-extremist laws have been used to demand access to messaging 
services. If the development towards more restrictions online continues, it may become a 
major issue that human rights NGOs need to tackle. 
For the time being however, opportunities for reaching out to local constituency online 
are still open, and these opportunities are used by the NGOs to tell their side of the story. For 
example, three of the NGOs I interviewed are participating in a joint project that seeks to 
counter public stigmatization by aiming to tell the public what human rights NGOs are 
actually doing and who they are. Employees and activists are followed with a video camera in 
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their daily duties. They do this as a response to delegitimization, which they seek to prove 
wrong by communicating better and more directly with ordinary people. 
Mendelson (2015: 5) poses the question: “Are organizations less vulnerable if they 
work on issues that either have traction or are framed in ways that resonate with public 
support?”  My findings indicate that the answer to this question is yes, and that NGOs are 
aware of this. They therefore seek to reframe their issues in ways that resonate well with the 
Russian population. For example, NGO 6 which works with migrants’ rights focus on how 
they help Ukrainian refugees. NGO 3, working on the rights of homeless people, pays close 
attention to public opinion and have succeeded at building a base of supporters and 
volunteers. “There are lots of organizations who don’t try to be as open as we are.” (Interview 
7), the respondent answered when I asked why they succeed and others fail to engage the 
public. H3 thus finds some support, but as shall be discussed in the next section on 
opportunities for funding, NGOs differ with regard to how easy and realistic it is for them to 
present themselves as appealing to the Russian population. 
5.4 Diversifying or sticking with foreign funding 
H4: NGOs will seek to diversify their sources of funding and look for domestic funding 
opportunities when foreign funding is restricted. 
Sufficient funding is of critical importance in order to maintain a professional NGO. 
Paying employees, having an office space and organizing activities cost money. In a country 
that lacks tradition for donating privately, and where NGOs are a relatively new phenomenon 
that throughout their short history have been heavily dependent on Western funding, NGOs 
are particularly vulnerable to laws that restrict access to their usual source of income. This 
vulnerability is exactly what the foreign agent law aims at. In the chapter two, it was assumed 
that NGOs faced with restrictions on foreign funding will strategically seek out domestic 
alternatives to replace the loss of foreign sources. This was confirmed with modifications by 
the respondents.  
By becoming less dependent on one type of income, the NGOs are putting up defense 
mechanisms that make them more robust against measures that aim to restrict them 
economically. The development towards increasingly diversifying where they get their 
income from is recognizable in other states where NGOs face similar challenges related to 
shrinking space. USAID highlighted this tendency in their 2016 index on civil society 
organization sustainability in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and underlines 
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crowdfunding as “an alternative source of funding in countries in which civic space is being 
restrained or access to foreign funding is restricted” (USAID 2017: 6). 
 Crowdfunding occurs when individuals support a project by donating small sums that 
combined allows for the realization of a bigger project. This type of funding is gaining 
popularity all across the world, and despite limited experiences with private donation as well 
as troubled economic times, Russia is no exception (OPRF 2017: 49). The internet and rise of 
social media have opened up new opportunities for spreading ideas as well as easy 
mechanisms for donating online. A plea for funding and instructions on how to do so is easily 
found on the front page of the webpages of most of the NGOs that I interviewed. One of my 
respondents was in charge of fundraising in her NGO, and she was enthusiastic about the 
prospects of crowdfunding where ordinary Russian people contribute and get involved with 
their projects: 
We are three persons working on fundraising, and we make really a lot of effort, like 
interesting actions and concerts. [..] It is possible. Our example shows that it is 
possible, that people want to give, but maybe don’t always know how and why. 
(Interview 8) 
The other employee I interviewed at the same time in the same organization was in 
charge of foreign funding, and followed up: 
It is really a question of reputation, because we are famous in the city, we have lots of 
documents on our web page and also people can come here and see what we do. 
(Interview 7) 
Currently about 30% of this NGO’s income comes from private donations from 
Russians, which is an unusually high percentage for Russian human rights NGOs. The two 
respondents underlined that they see a tendency in that people individually on average donate 
less than before, but more people are giving, so despite generally lower sums, they still end up 
with receiving more in total. As discussed in the theory chapter, focusing on transparency has 
been emphasized in the literature as a particularly useful approach for human rights NGOs in 
low income countries where corruption is a significant issue (Ron, Kaire et al. 2018). This 
NGO seemed to have success with the transparency approach. 
The strengthened focus on smaller donations from ordinary Russian citizen does not 
only pay off in financial terms: the literature also led us to expect that NGOs have much to 
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win on countering delegitimization efforts by responding with more openness. By involving 
ordinary citizens as supporters both financially and in volunteer work, they disprove 
accusations of being “elitist and out of touch with on-the-ground realities” (Tiwana 2018: 
165), thus making themselves less vulnerable to restrictive measures that are justified by a 
portrayal of human rights NGOs as little else than Western-minded elite organizations. Local 
grass roots activity in the form of small individual donations reflects that the NGO that 
receives money is perceived as relevant in Russian people’s daily life, and that its activities 
are important to those who contribute with donations. Local relevance is something that many 
of the Western-funded NGOs have struggled with achieving. 
My findings support what USAID concluded with in their 2017 report:  That 
crowdfunding can play an important role in both replacing costly-to-access foreign funding 
and building a base of supporters at the grassroots level. While acknowledging the effects 
crowdfunding initiatives can have on specific one-time issues, the report questions 
crowdfunding’s potential for being a long-term stable source of income for Russian NGOs 
(USAID 2017: 204).  
 
Governmental funding through grants could be a welcome substitute to ensure the 
stability that foreign funding up until recently could offer, but there are several issues here.  
Firstly, if the main point of the foreign agent-law is to “starve out” critical voices, then why 
should the government want to pay to keep them alive? The evidence at hand however shows 
that there are some grants options available for human rights NGOs, also for those in the 
foreign agent-registry, and that the NGOs with various degree of success apply for these 
grants. One example is NGO 1, which today is off the foreign agent-registry after 
entrepreneuring its way out of it: 
 
We got foreign funding and did not hide this. When the hunt for NGOs began in 2011, 
everything worsened, and then the Ukraine conflict. We had an inspection, checking 
our activities, and we understood that we may get the label. Before the inspection 
finished, we stopped to receive foreign funding because we wanted to escape the label. 
But the Ministry of Justice included us on the list anyways. So for one year we had no 
foreign support, but we got a presidential grant. Much less funding than we were used 




 Out of the NGOs interviewed for this thesis, this one stands out by responding most 
actively by looking at ways to get off the foreign agent-registry. It is interesting to note that 
although the NGO was labeled foreign agent, they still succeeded in getting governmental 
funding that allowed them to carry on with their activities. Without this source of funding, 
they would either have had to continue to receive funding from abroad or seriously cut down 
on their level of activity. This is in line with a comment made by Putin when the law on 
foreign agents was approved in 2012:  
 
As for not-for-profit organizations, I agree with those colleagues who consider that if 
we are tightening up the funding rules for them, we should obviously increase our own 
financial support for their activities (Putin quoted in Daucé 2014: 246). 
Establishing opportunities to apply for funding in the form of presidential grants and 
through other governmental programs shows the Russian government’s will to substitute 
funding from abroad with real domestic alternatives. Despite the ongoing crisis in the Russian 
economy, the funds available in the form of presidential grants for non-commercial civil 
society organizations increased from 4.2 billion rubles in 2015 to 4.6 billion rubles in 2016 
(NGO-Lawyers'-Club 2016: 38, USAID 2017: 203). This comes in addition to grants awarded 
through the Ministries of Economic Development, Culture, Labor, Education and Science, 
and Emergency, which also increased from 2015 to 2016 (OPRF 2017: 29). These initiatives 
demonstrate that Russian policies towards the non-profit sector is not all about strangling civil 
society, and that investing in building NGOs and their competence is seen as a wanted 
development. 
  However, a 2016 law further clarified the division between unwanted foreign agent-
NGOs and socially oriented “useful-for-the-whole” NGOs by opening up new grant 
possibilities for: 
[…] non-profit NGOs which for one or more years have been providing socially 
beneficial services of adequate quality, do not perform the functions of a foreign agent 
and have no arrears on any taxes, duties or other payments required by the Russian 
federal law (Skokova 2016: 130).  
Only one of the NGOs that I interviewed has passed through the needle’s eye into this 
category, namely NGO 3 which works on the least controversial issue: the rights of homeless 
people. This NGO was even awarded a grant from the Ministry of Economic Development 
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specifically earmarked for legislation monitoring. After the law became implemented, NGOs 
that work with issues that lead them to criticize government have had a harder time reaching 
up in the competition for scarce government funding, although my respondents reported that it 
is still possible to succeed: 
We did not get presidential grants, but I heard that supposedly those who are foreign 
agents have never been officially banned from getting that. Some of them got it this 
year. […] Don’t get me wrong, it is not like it is very rosy and nice, but there are some 
structures that the government is trying to make to create support and show that they 
support NGOs. But of course, most who get them are more “safe” than human rights 
organizations, for example organizations that help kids or work with animals 
(Interview 11). 
The respondent is correct in believing that foreign agent NGOs never have been 
completely blacklisted from applying for financial support in the form of presidential grants. 
In a detailed list on the presidential grant webpages that covers what type of entities that 
cannot take part in the competition for grants5, foreign agent NGOs are not specifically 
mentioned. However, as the government continues to institutionalize the division between 
“loyal” and “disloyal” NGOs, it has gotten harder to obtain governmental funding. As NGO 5 
has experienced 
We […] received some presidential grants from Pamfilova6 among others. Now we do 
not have any [governmental funding], for more than a year now. […] We cannot win 
every time, but from some moment we stopped to win at all. So now… well we have 
one Russian source […]. Other than that, it is all foreign funding (Interview 10). 
 
The increasing focus on dividing civil society into “loyal” and “disloyal” leaves a dual 
picture. For the disloyal, space is closing also in financial terms. However, while space is 
closing for some, it is opening for others – namely the loyal and service-providing NGOs. As 
                                                          





6 National Ombudsman for human rights until 2016 
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discussed above, the amount available to apply governmental support from is steadily 
increasing, but there is a tendency for these funds to be earmarked to service providing NGOs.  
The authorities also encourage and help foreign agent NGOs to become less dependent 
on foreign funding by giving advice on how to get funding from Russian sources. NGO 6 
applied for assistance and succeeded: 
We just told them about our organization, about what competence we lack in order to 
succeed and develop. In our case that is fundraising, which is our weak spot. We do 
pretty good with funds, meaning especially foreign funds. We know how to deal with 
them, we know how to write a grant proposal, we know how to do our reports. Like, 
we know what they expect and how to deliver. It is easy for us because we have done it 
for a long time. But as for private donations, you know, like when people give on the 
internet, we do not have a lot of experience with that. And any NGO should diversify 
their resources, it is very important to do that. So that is what we applied for, we said 
we lack competence with fundraising. I don't really know how that collaboration is 
going to work out, because we have never taken part in anything like that before, so I 
don’t know what we can expect. But as far as I know, we are going to get someone 
who will advise us on that (Interview 11). 
This NGO then, which still is in the foreign agent registry, will now be receiving state-
sponsored expertise on how to become less dependent on foreign funding, while still being 
able to continue receiving funding from abroad and working with political issues related to 
migration and the rights of stateless people. When I asked if they had encountered any issues 
related to their status as foreign agents during the application procedure, the impression from 
the last quote is somewhat modified: 
Officially it was stated nowhere that foreign agents are exempt from that. I don’t 
know, well we clearly stated it at the second [round] … I don’t know if we wrote 
anything about it in the first round of applications maybe we just… We didn’t do it on 
purpose, but it is just that we ourselves don’t really regard that status as something 
that defines us. So I think that we forgot to mention that we are foreign agent, and also 
I think we are sometimes a little bit arrogant in that we think that everyone knows who 
we are, because we are quite famous abroad and also in certain circles in Russia. […] 
But in the second round we did state it out loud during the presentation, but it seemed 
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to be no real problem. Although there were no other foreign agents there in that 
round. The others were all, like, “safer” (Interview 11). 
To sum up then, literature predicted that NGOs faced with restrictions on foreign 
funding strategically will seek out domestic alternatives to replace the loss of old funding 
sources. While almost everyone interviewed for this thesis belong to entities that for the 
longest part of their existence have had foreign funding as their main source, I found that how 
successful they have been in finding domestic sources of income varies greatly. It depends on 
the specific context and in any case, completely replacing foreign funding is a very 
challenging task for any Russian human rights NGO. 
My interviews show that seeking out domestic alternatives to foreign funding is a 
more viable option for NGOs that are working on less sensitive issues. These are also the 
NGOs that are most likely to succeed at getting governmental funding in the first place and 
are therefore less likely to struggle financially. Human rights issues are often characterized by 
being what Sikkink calls “counter-majoritarian” by nature: it is in fact many times exactly the 
indifference and even the values and actions of the majority population that calls for 
defending a particular human rights issue (Sikkink 2018: 173). While reaching out to the grass 
roots for support may be a fruitful approach for NGOs that are easier to swallow for the 
majority population, this is not an option that is equally available to all kinds of human rights 
NGOs.  
Summarized, my empirical findings suggest that Russian human rights NGOs have 
responded to restrictions on foreign funding in three different ways:  
1) Some have continued to have foreign funding as their main and perhaps only 
source of stable income. 
2) Some have cut foreign funding off completely.  
3) The most common response was however to search for new ways to obtain 
funding, such as crowdfunding and different government programs, and hereby 
diversify where they get their means from.  
H4 have been partly verified, as the NGOs are searching for alternative sources of 
funding. However, important differences in how they do this and to what degree they are 
succeeding have been shed light on.  
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5.5.1 Participating in limited pluralism 
H5:  Faced with restrictions, NGOs will embrace the opportunities they are left with and 
therefore choose to participate in limited pluralism. 
I will start this section by providing an overview of how the NGOs view the 
usefulness and potential of the three organs described in chapter four. Next, I discuss in what 
type of situations cooperation with the authorities is perceived as useful by the NGOs. This 
will uncover a dilemma, as human rights NGOs by participating can arguably assist 
authoritarianism. The issue of legitimacy will be discussed against this backdrop. 
The Civic Chambers: Creating alternative civic actors 
The Civic Chambers were perceived as the least relevant for their daily work by the 
respondents, but this could be a coincidence and I might have gotten different answers if I had 
succeeded in obtaining interviews with someone who is represented there. However, all of the 
NGOs that I met with are well-known Russian human rights NGOs, and that none of these 
reported having close ties to anyone represented in the Civic Chambers points in the direction 
that the Civic Chambers are part of Russia’s strategy of creating alternative civic actors. This 
impression coincides with one respondent’s view that the working areas of the federal Civic 
Chamber slowly, but steadily has steered in the direction of limiting itself to social issues: 
What does human rights mean, what rights? If we are talking about civil rights, [the 
Civic Chamber] is completely pointless. If we talk about social rights, something may 
be done there, that is completely different. Social rights - I do not deal with that, but I 
see that it can be effective. Because it is not political. Or it is not seen as political. 
Anything related to civil rights was possible to discuss in the Civic Chamber 
previously, but this institution seriously changed and not to the better, gradually. If 
you compare different terms, you see. And at the same time, the issues (sic) that are 
possible to discuss in the Civic Chamber are more influential than what is possible in 
the presidential council (Interview 10). 
By increasingly using the Civic Chambers as arenas to develop civil society’s ability 
to deal with social issues and service providing, the division between useful “socially 
oriented” NGOs and potentially dangerous and more critical human rights NGOs is 
underlined. Despite this, my respondents did however not experience the Civic Chambers as a 
“split-and-conquer”-form of tactic. There was rather a consensus among the respondents that 
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the Civic Chambers were just not perceived as a relevant place for them to be included, and 
hence not something they were applying to be represented in. One exception was the Civic 
Chambers’ role concerning the prison observer commissions; the ONKs. It is the Civic 
Chambers that based on nominations from NGOs are responsible for putting together the 
regional ONKs.  
ONKs: forcing them to stop doing bad things and start doing good things 
The prison observer commissions, the ONKs, were on the other hand stressed as being 
a particular useful place to be by the respondents because of their “practical value” (Interview 
9). The Civic Chambers choose 5-40 representatives depending on the size of the region every 
third year and these are granted the right to enter detention and prison facilities and speak 
with prisoners in order to oversee that their rights are being upheld (Flikke 2018). When I 
asked the respondents open questions concerning which government organs they perceived as 
most relevant to be represented in, the ONKs often came up first. A current member of the 
ONK describes their role in this way: 
We do not have any powers as such, prescribed by the law, but our presence there, us 
talking directly with violators of human rights, we pinpoint where they are violating 
the rights of people. We basically just force them to stop doing bad things and start 
doing good things.  […] [the ONK] is a very effective instrument that helps a lot in 
order for us to do our job (Interview 9). 
The last round of elections to the ONKs in 2016 was met with criticism from the 
human rights community in both St Petersburg and Moscow. Several long-time human rights 
defenders were denied a place due to so-called “formal” reasons. One of the respondents had 
been denied a place in the ONK and he was under the impression that the rejection was made 
on the basis of him coming from a foreign agent NGO, even though the NGO he works in 
actually had succeeded in de-registering from the foreign agent registry at the time of the 
election (Interview 4).  Who, then, are the second half of the ONK members that both the 
Ombudsman office and the human rights community in St Petersburg and Moscow criticized 
for doing a poor job? An ONK-member underlined that although “a lot of people who have no 
connection to human rights become members of the ONK”, these sometimes surprise him by 
“actually start doing things» (Interview 9).  Others mentioned that the places are occupied by 
“GONGO people” who stick with doing the bare minimum of what their mandate prescribes 
them to do, thus slowing down the overall efficacy of the ONKs (Interview 2 and Interview 
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4). The term GONGO refers to government organized NGOs, and Russia has since it started 
to restrict NGOs’ opportunity structures in the early-mid 2000s applied this strategy. Twelve 
years after Gershman and Allen commented that “Russia has been more aggressive than most 
in employing quasi-autonomous groups” as a strategy of undermining the NGO-sector 
(Gershman and Allen 2006: 44-45), we continue to see that alternative government-initiated 
civic actors are central in pushing out the more autonomous and critical NGOs from state 
initiated civil society meeting places.  
Even though space seems to be closing also on this arena after the last ONK elections, 
there are nuances to this. There are examples of ONK-members coming from the human 
rights NGO community being recruited to permanent jobs as advisors in the penitentiary 
systems after having done a good job in the ONK (Interview 9).  The respondents were quite 
unanimous on that once you are in the ONK, you and your NGO are in a good position to 
have a real impact and real opportunities to prevent human rights violations in prisons. 
The Presidential Council: They talk 
Most of the respondents either had personal ties or connections through their NGO to 
someone in the PCHRCS. Although the respondents in general did not have much faith in the 
council’s potential for having a real impact on the human rights issues their NGOs are 
working on, they still reported other benefits. One example is from NGO 1, where the 
respondent underlined that the participation of a central member of their NGO in the 
PCHRCS gives them leverage:  
In fact, for many government officials and representatives of the Ministry of Defense, 
that one of the colleagues of our organization is in the council, that is legalized by the 
president, that is under the president - well, then you take our opinion into account. 
Because without this presidential council, very many state bodies consider us enemies 
of the motherland, foreign agents, enemy spies […] who work to break up […] the 
country (Interview 4). 
 This leverage can then be used to diminish some of the stigma that comes with the 
foreign agent-label, and ease communication with other state bodies, which this specific NGO 
engages actively in.  
Still, the success rate of the council with regard to having a visible effect on 
influencing policy development was repeatedly reported as low. As one respondent put it: 
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“Well, it's a council - they talk” (Interview 9). A current member of the Council shared this 
impression, and stated this when asked why he continues to be a member despite having very 
limited influence: 
Partly it’s because there is still some hope that something can be done. Of course the 
level of achievement is very low, but it is not difficult being a member. So why not? 
(Interview 10).  
For others, these two reasons are not sufficient to continue to stay in the council. One 
respondent had chosen to withdraw from the council, despite her presence being desired there:  
The leader of the council very much would like me to come back, and probably still 
wants me to. […] But what is the meaning of being an advisor to a person [Putin] that 
does not listen to advice? Therefore, I left, and I did not come back. (Interview 12)   
As is the case with the Civic Chambers and the ONKs discussed above, we can also 
here observe that the heavy presence of alternative civic actors is central:   
Informally, those who support human rights as values and those, let's say, who 
oppose, it is half and half. Maybe no… am I fair? I think more human rights, [we] are 
in majority. But it is not a clear division. There are not two fractions (Interview 10). 
This is similar to the statements of the ONK-member in the section above (Interview 
9), who also argued that members who come off with a first impression of being apparently 
not very preoccupied with human rights can change, and that positions vary from case to case. 
5.5.2 Understanding how and why NGOs cooperate or stay away: When 
is cooperation perceived as useful? 
The discussion of the three different type of organs highlight why and how these are 
used by human rights NGOs. It is equally important to understand why some NGOs choose to 
abstain from deliberative forms of participation. The respondents were in different positions 
to get included in decision processes not only because they had access to different 
opportunities, but also as a result of more or less intentional strategic choices. I was therefore 
met with a broad diversity of responses to the open question: How do you propose solutions 
to the government? Sometimes the respondents responded that they were uncertain about 
exactly what kind of information I was looking for when asking this question. Several 
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respondents automatically took the question to mean their court activities and work on law 
proposals, like NGO 5: 
The most effective instrument [to propose solutions] is preparing legal reviews on 
draft laws, finding some discrepancies, some ways to stop it - in a technical sense 
(Interview 10). 
NGO 2 even claimed that proposing solutions to government is not really something 
they do, and that they mostly stay away other than when meeting in court: 
We are used to not communicate with them, and we don’t really need it because our 
way of working now is really comfortable for us. […] We are not really trying to 
propose solutions to government, we are just trying to fight […] some problems with 
human rights information that government or some officials do and we try to protect 
rights in court - this is almost always the most effective way (Interview 6). 
These statements signal that some NGOs are choosing to step away from 
recommending solutions to government through consultative bodies alltogether, and rather 
prefer to set precedents in court. This approach diverges from the majority of the respondents 
interviewed for this thesis. Where the general trend was that the NGOs either were actively 
involved in proposing solutions or stated that they were trying to do so, NGO 2 seemingly 
opted for staying out of it altogether.  
The theory chapter assumed that human rights NGOs that work on less sensitive issues 
and are service providers will both on an informal and formal level face different and less 
severe restrictions than those who focus on the more contentious issues. This is reflected in 
deliberation opportunities in several ways. The discussion on the three different types of 
organs showed that the presence of alternative civic actors is heavy in all kinds of 
deliberation. Particularly the Civic Chambers have developed into becoming a forum for civil 
society actors that provide services and are more concerned with solving social issues than 
with rights-related issues.  
Lorch and Bunk (2017: 990) maintain that opportunities for NGOs to engage in 
deliberation and limited participation in authoritarian settings can depoliticize social 
discontent and channel it “into forms of collective action that do not threaten the authoritarian 
political order”. The respondents in this thesis experienced that participation is more fruitful if 
the issue they are working on is depoliticized. For example, one member of the PCHRCS 
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suggests that taking part in consultative mechanisms is more rewarding for NGOs that work 
with issues that are less politically sensitive: 
Those members who are involved in issues like […] prison systems or medical issues - 
the council is more effective for them, because these issues are less politicized. [NGO 
5’s main field of interest] is highly politicized. And that is why the efficiency is low 
(Interview 10). 
Even though the respondent is working on issues that he perceives as “highly 
politicized” and the NGO he leads is in the foreign agents-registry, he is still invited to give 
advice to the president. Although being declared a foreign agent sends a strong message that 
the NGO is understood as problematic, they are paradoxically still invited to take part in 
giving advice. Despite statements from Putin on how taking advice from individuals that are 
associated with foreign agents is useless, in spring 2018 the situation is still not completely 
hostile for activists representing human rights NGOs that have been labeled foreign agents: 
Interviewer: Your NGO being on the foreign agent list has no consequences for you as 
a member in the council?  
Respondent: Yeah, no consequences. There are several agents there, I'm not alone. 6 
or 7, I don’t remember. Maybe we will be excluded, because it is funny that foreign 
agents are members of the Presidential Council, it's strange really. But from the 
formal point of view it is possible, why not. Especially because it is not our personal 
feature, it is the feature of our organizations. (Interview 10) 
 
This statement brings up the issue of the upcoming draft on a law that opens up for 
classifying also individuals as foreign agents. Originally rejected in the Duma in the first 
hearing, the second hearing was postponed until after the March 2018 elections (Digges 
2018). If the label “foreign agent” becomes a personal feature, as the respondent calls it, it 
might get more problematic for the persons that receive it to participate in consultative 
mechanisms and control organs. As was the case with the foreign agent-law, it is natural to 
assume that also this law will go through a period of adjusting to real-life practice.  It is 
difficult to say something for certain about how the law will function, but as it seems now, 




5.5.3 Institutionalizing pluralism in an authoritarian setting: Do human 
rights NGOs assist authoritarianism? 
Theory presented in chapter two suggests that competitive authoritarian regimes have 
much to gain from institutionalizing pluralism in civil society in a controlled and limited 
manner because it can improve governance and increase stability. This however presupposes 
that one succeeds at weeding out the potentially destabilizing parts of civil society, which is 
where the need to shrink space for civic activism comes in. Chapter four demonstrated how 
Russia’s NGO-legislation and consultative and monitoring organs in the human rights sphere 
have developed over the course of the last twenty-five years and concluded that the resulting 
picture fits well with how the literature has framed competitive authoritarian regimes’ rational 
motivations for reshaping the opportunity structures for civil society. The analysis so far has 
showed that the human rights community actively uses the ONKs and the PCHRCS in their 
work. There is therefore reason to ask: Do human rights NGOs help keep authoritarianism 
sustainable by not opposing co-optation? Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010: 148) argue that 
structures where the state uses the expertise of civil society forces is beneficial to 
authoritarian regimes because they publicize information that otherwise would go under the 
radar. It can be argued that there are three different ways in which NGOs contribute to 
increased stability in Russia today through participation in consultative mechanisms and 
control organs:  
• By acting as barometers that provide information that otherwise would have 
been lost in suppression. 
• By acting as experts that provide up-to-date information on their specialized 
field. 
• By acting as watchdogs that uncover poor governance and corruption. 
Barometer 
“The absence of dialogue is a straight path towards social unrest” (OPRF 2017: 8), the 
federal Civic Chamber stated in their 2017 report, before going straight on to name countering 
“destructive activism” as one of the main challenges for Russian civil society institutions, 
because “[…] extreme and radical advocacy […] undermine public order and overall stability 
in the country, constitutional rights of the country’s citizens and the values of the Russian 
society.” (ibid.)   
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Schedler (2013: 68) argues that uncertainty and lack of information on what actually 
goes on in society is a major risk factor in semi-authoritarian regimes. By not knowing the 
temperature under the lid, it is hard to know how hot the water in the kettle is before it 
suddenly boils over. NGOs represent the aggregate of interests of groups, thus are they 
gatekeepers of valuable sources of information. This makes staying in touch with diverse 
types of NGOs a key security concern in order to prevent uprisings and stay ahead of color 
revolutions. A recent example of such security-thinking comes from the PCHRCS’s last 
meeting in October 2017, when President Putin stated that:  
We need this Council to continue to act as a barometer of the public mood and to give 
priority attention to matters of concern for the majority of people (kremlin.ru 2017). 
By referring to the PCHRCS as a measuring instrument, he talks about it as a tool 
designed to help make up for the institutional weaknesses inherent in competitive 
authoritarian regimes. The barometer function is therefore best understood as benefiting 
mostly the regime but can also benefit NGOs if the information they provide actually serves 
to influence policy in the way they prefer.  
Experts 
NGOs roles as experts can be divided in two. Firstly, they know their field superbly. 
Through decades of work in different spheres of human rights work, NGOs have accumulated 
valuable insights and expertise knowledge. They have knowledge-based opinions about where 
the problems are found and suggestions on how to fix them. This applies to foreign agent 
NGOs as well. As NHC underlined: “To be named foreign agent – that is a sign of quality” 
(Interview 1).  That the Ministry of Justice has done a thorough job on evaluating the NGO 
and found it to fulfil the necessary requirements of a foreign agent means that the NGO’s 
capabilities are taken seriously. Several of the NGOs had experience with providing expert 
knowledge requested by the authorities also outside the ONKs and the PCHRCS. This can be 
done for example through commercial contracts (Interview 10), by co-organizing yearly 
conferences (Interview 4), and temporary working groups dedicated to specific issues 
(Interview 6). 
Secondly, they are experts in how to run an NGO successfully. The authorities have 
over the last years increasingly taken steps to develop competence in NGOs (OPRF 2017: 31). 
This kind of support was also the focus of Western democracy support initiatives that rose to 
prominence in the nineties, where partnerships between foreign NGOs and Russian NGOs 
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aimed at training the Russian partners in how to run an organization successfully where 
established (Henderson 2003: 76-77). Many human rights NGOs that enjoyed the benefits of 
various democracy building-programs focus on competence development in NGOs and can 
contribute by sharing their knowledge with newer NGOs. Like the Western civil society-
exporters, the Russian authorities understand that funding is not everything when it comes to 
building civil society. A diverse skillset is needed in order to maintain an NGO over time. The 
federal Civic Chamber has begun to organize courses for activists, and another example is the 
Moscow House which now offers a wide variety of resources to NGOs of all categories 
(USAID 2017: 208).  In a report on civil society development in Russia in 2016, USAID 
(2017: 208) notes that NGOs working with issues related to democracy and human rights to a 
large degree choose not to take part in these government-initiated workshops.  
 This seems to be the impression based on the interviews that I have conducted as well. 
While mentioning being more in touch with and actively using civil society-initiated NGO 
resource centers such as the St. Petersburg Human Rights Resource Centre, some of my 
respondents also reported that they have taken part in government-initiated NGO-courses or 
are planning to do so in the near future. One example is NGO 3, which works on the rights of 
homeless people. This NGO stated that they had been approached by the authorities and asked 
to help organize a workshop for other NGOs, so they could teach best-practices.  
Watchdogs 
NGOs as barometers of the public mood and NGOs as experts in their specific field 
reflect the stability-promoting features of the Civil Society I argument as discussed in chapter 
two. However, the fact that NGOs are welcomed and invited in to participate as watchdogs 
highlights that competitive authoritarian regimes can, paradoxically, have an interest in the 
virtues of the Civil Society II argument, which holds that civil society is important and 
valuable because it functions as a counterweight to state power. 
Contributing to keeping corruption under control has been a long-time goal for Kremlin’s 
support for civil society (Richter 2009b: 45). Using NGOs’ expertise to perform watchdog-
functions can contribute to increasing the regime’s legitimacy. 
[A constructive dialogue] is easier when we have the same interests. Some are not 
ready for dialogue. Corruption is a barrier for us. When we try to do something, we 
disturb corruption. And we show that people can do something for themselves, with 




This NGO’s experiences show that deliberation also can present a challenge to the 
status quo, as more openness can uncover corruption. NGOs’ experiences with consultative 
mechanisms and participating in control organs demonstrate that the state apparatus is not one 
coherent actor and there are conflicting motivations inside it. While NGO 4 reported success 
with offering advice to some government agencies, they experienced the opposite elsewhere: 
They still consider us as a burden to them, not as a potential highlighter of problems 
that they need to tackle. […] They need to understand that we are there to help, we are 
not there to fight with them (Interview 9). 
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2010: 147) argue that “together, the ability to promote 
legitimacy, heal division, secure tractable collective choice, solve social problems effectively, 
and promote reflexivity mean that the deliberative capacity contributes to state building as 
well as democratic consolidation”. By participating in state organized bodies, NGOs 
contribute with information that is valuable to the state in terms of on-the-ground knowledge 
of what is perceived as important in society, expertise knowledge, and combating corruption. 
In this sense, their participation in institutionalized and limited pluralism can be said to help 
state building more than democratic consolidation. This leads us to the next discussion: How 
is the relationship between likeminded human rights NGOs – Is there a discussion on whether 
to participate or not?  
 
5.5.4 Discussing legitimacy and the relationship between those who 
participate and those who stay out 
  The theory chapter identified a dilemma facing human rights NGOs that are invited to 
participate in deliberation in authoritarian settings: On one hand, participation gives 
opportunities to influence issues that are central to them. Even though formal opportunities to 
influence decision making through deliberative arenas are lacking, these organs present useful 
opportunities to voice issues and set the agenda. According to Sikkink’s notion of 
“effectiveness politics”, NGOs should want to make use of such opportunities (Rodríguez-
Garavito and Gomez 2018: 34). On the other hand, participation is as argued above to the 
advantage of the regime and can thus contribute in making authoritarianism more sustainable. 
Following this line of thought, NGOs that participate put their approval stamp on the 
framework they are operating under. By taking part in consultative structures and control 
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mechanisms, they subsequently also contribute to legitimize the regime (Lorch and Bunk 
2017: 991). Due to this, NGOs that have the opportunity to take part may still choose to stay 
out. This section will therefore explore the issue of legitimacy and the relationship between 
those who participate and those who stay out.  
A current member of the PCHRCS reflects on human rights activists’ role in 
contributing to legitimacy: 
There are arguments that - and I always hear them - that being a member of such 
bodies, people like me and other activists - we legitimize the political regime. I do not 
feel it like that. I think that’s an overestimation of our role. We cannot legitimize or  
delegitimze the regime whatever we do. There are different strategies that to different 
degrees involve cooperation with the authorities. The only way to not cooperate is 
uprising. We do not go this way, we have to cooperate, the question is what kind of 
cooperation is to be chosen. (Interview 10) 
The concern the respondent refers to here, that cooperation can be seen as a form of 
legitimizing the regime, was an accusation that was indeed brought up by several other 
interviewees who stood on the outside of consultative structures either as a result of an active 
choice or because they are not invited. When Putin was reelected and returned to his third 
term of presidency, a group of members in the PCHRCS chose to resign, with not wanting to 
contribute to legitimize the constitution-breach as a central motivation. One interviewee was 
amongst those who decided to step down, and the respondent was at a loss as to why 
respected human rights defenders still choose to take part in the PCHRCS: 
This is incomprehensible to me - I cannot understand it. They think they can still do 
something. When I left, Medvedev looked at me and said: What you are doing, is not 
right, and also something like that the presence of the president is very important. 
Well, yes, I agree that it is important. [...] But there are two sides to this: Firstly, that 
you legitimize - you give legitimacy to this president. And secondly, what can you do? 
[…] Maybe you can do something, but now I do not see it (Interview 12). 
Alongside the claim that those who participate necessarily also contribute to 
legitimizing the current regime, some respondents also voiced suspicion that the motives of 
those who participate are not purely confined to improving the human rights situation in 
Russia. Taking part, and particularly in the prestigious PCHRCS, puts you as an individual in 
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the limelight, which may in itself be a goal for some human rights defenders.  The well-
connected activist that I interviewed who had long experience with working in one of the 
oldest human rights NGOs was in particular adamant about this (Interview 2). Respondents 
that were participating in different types of cooperation structures did of course not state this 
as a motivation for participating, but an ONK-member acknowledged that it was an honor for 
him personally to take part: 
As a member of [my NGO], it is a huge privilege for me to be a member of the ONK 
(Interview 9). 
 At the same time, the respondents that were critical towards participation 
paradoxically reported that they frequently get in touch with friends and acquaintances that 
are members in consultative structures, and that they in this way intentionally utilize their 
social and professional networks to promote issues and reach their goals.  
In sum, my findings show that Russian human rights NGOs are divided in their view 
on how they should approach opportunities to participate in consultative structures and 
control organs. Taken together, the respondents interviewed for this thesis were mostly 
positive to participating in deliberation. Even the most critical voices, such as respondent 2 
the activist and respondent 12 the long-time NGO leader who had withdrawn from the 
PCHRCS reported that they frequently use people in their networks who are represented in 
consultative organs. H5 can therefore neither be completely confirmed nor completely 
dismissed. Although the number of respondents is too low to say something generalizable 
about how Russian human rights NGOs adapt in order to get included in decision processes 
my findings indicate that the respondents perceive deliberation as useful, and hence as giving 
room for “effectiveness politics”. The Civic Chambers, the ONKs, and the PCHRCS are thus 
all something else than purely “facades of democracy”.  
 
5.6 Summarizing discussion: How are NGOs learning to adapt to closing 
space? 
A recurring theme throughout the analysis has been that NGOs are learning to adapt to 
closing space by learning to cope with uncertainty. From the cat-and-mouse-game of finding 
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new legal organizational forms to the search for finding sustainable funding models, NGOs 
are experiencing that tomorrow the rules may look different. 
The foreign agent law and other restrictive laws governing civil society tend to both 
have loosely conceptualized key terms as well as to be selectively applied. As a result, it is 
often complicated to predict the possible costs of being affected for NGOs that are in the 
danger zone. They need to be on the alert for responding to possible future scenarios due to 
the unpredictability and vagueness that characterizes the closing of civic space. One employee 
in an NGO that has not been named foreign agent summarizes this point: 
For us, it is just not clear what the consequences will be. In the beginning, they said 
that foreign agent-NGOs will not get money from the state. But last year, there was an 
organization that got funds from the president's grants, and this organization is a 
foreign agent [..]. For example, this building of ours belongs to the city, so it is not 
clear what could happen. We really need to know how big the problem will be. 
(Interview 8) 
One of the other NGOs I interviewed experienced that the rent agreement for their 
long-time headquarters was cancelled by the city Property Department without explanation 
when they received the foreign agent status, so the respondent’s fear is not without reason. In 
this sense, not knowing for sure the concrete implications of being added to the foreign agent-
list adds to the restrictive consequences of the legislation. NGOs thus need to safeguard 
against possible hypothetical scenarios that they cannot even be certain will become reality if 
they are affected by the law. The respondent underlined the uncertainty that comes with the 
constant shapeshifting that characterizes how the foreign agent-law is enforced: 
 
If we become foreign agent today, then that is one problem, if we become it in 5 years 
it will be another problem entirely. (Interview 8) 
 
This statement reflects how constant learning by doing has marked Russia’s take on 
restricting civil society. Both authorities as well as NGOs are changing strategies on the go.  
 
The overall findings lead us back to the discussion in the theory-chapter that presented 
the virtues of civil society as a two-edged sword for competitive authoritarian regimes. 
Combined with the empirical insight on how civil society actors view deliberation as both 
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beneficial as it provides opportunities for “effectiveness politics” and at the same time as 
problematic because it gives legitimacy to the regime, this adds up to the question: What does 
the use of co-optative measures mean for Russia -  is it a path towards deliberation without 
transition or a path towards deliberation-led democratization?  The analysis suggests that the 
answer to this question will depend in part on how civil society will adapt to the mix of new 








The starting point of this thesis was the observation that although Russian human 
rights NGOs have been the targets of increasingly restrictive measures over the last fifteen 
years, they have nevertheless also been invited to take part in an increasing number of bodies 
tasked with consulting and monitoring. I asked how NGOs have responded to this at first sight 
puzzling combination: 
In what ways do Russian human rights NGOs respond to new restrictions, and why 
and how do they participate in co-optation efforts from the state? 
The research question was anchored in a theoretical discussion of arguments that 
postulate the development of a vibrant civil society as a necessity for successful 
democratization and in an empirical discussion that demonstrated how Russia has gone down 
a semi-authoritarian path where the regime has cherry-picked only the elements of the civil 
society arguments that are beneficial to its stability. Finally, the analysis explored in what 
ways human rights NGOs have responded to the resulting framework. 
6.1 Main empirical findings 
Russia’s new restrictions as well as a climate of delegitimization targeting human 
rights activism have resulted in NGOs both being forced to and having more or less 
voluntarily chosen to develop new tactics. The findings show variations in how the NGOs 
adapt to closing space, and two patterns were found.  
The NGOs I interviewed work with issues that vary with regard to how relevant or 
easy it is for them to build a Russian base of supporters and volunteers, and the thesis finds 
that this variation can help explain differences concerning how NGOs respond to restrictions. 
Concerning the financial situation, it is easier to replace foreign funding with Russian funding 
if the NGO works with issues that ordinary Russians can be persuaded to contribute to by 
crowdfunding. However, many human rights NGOs concentrate on issues that are counter-
majoritarian by their very nature, and these have less potential to replace foreign funding with 
Russian funding. Furthermore, the counter-majoritarian NGOs reported less frequently than 




However, NGOs that front issues that for various reasons do not resonate well with the 
general Russian public may paradoxically enough benefit when responding to restrictions that 
target the organizational structure of NGOs. As they have less of a good reputation to 
maintain to begin with, they can afford to care less about being delegitimized – it is less costly 
for them as they already have a low level of trust in the public. My empirical findings suggest 
that they therefore allow themselves to experiment more with alternative ways of structuring, 
such as working without a legal entity and finding creative ways to keep accessing foreign 
funding. For NGOs that front issues and work in ways that are characterized by more contact 
with ordinary Russians, delegitimization can be said to come at a higher cost. They are 
therefore both more willing to and more able to decline foreign funding, as well as finding 
new ways to engage and mobilize supporters. 
The analysis found that NGOs participate in co-optative organs by fulfilling three 
different kinds of functions: They act as barometers on what is important to people, as experts 
on the issues they work with, and finally as watchdogs. The two last functions are important 
drivers for why NGOs want to participate in limited pluralism. The prison observer 
commissions (ONK) were perceived by interviewees as a relatively well functioning control 
mechanism, where members who put down much effort can achieve noticeable results. The 
Civic Chambers were perceived as being more relevant for NGOs that work on social issues 
than for human rights NGOs. Respondents viewed participation in the PCHRCS as having 
little, but some effect on policy development. Participation does not demand much time and 
resources, and NGOs with members represented there experienced being perceived as more 
“legitimate” when they work with different partners.  
Not all human rights NGOs want to participate directly in structures that they perceive 
as co-optation efforts. When they choose to stay away, it is mainly due to two reasons: Firstly, 
they see limited effects of participation and are therefore reluctant to spend time and resources 
when it does not help their cause. Secondly, there is the issue of legitimacy. To some of the 
respondents, participation is problematic because they see it as putting an approval stamp on a 
regime they cannot agree with. Nevertheless, the study also found that NGOs who share this 
more critical view on co-optation are in close touch with likeminded actors in the human 
rights community that do participate, and that they forge alliances and use their personal 




6. 2 Contributions to theory 
The thesis has contributed to theory by shedding light on in what sense hybridity is a 
key feature with regard to how competitive authoritarian regimes deal with civil society. It has 
agrees with Foley and Edwards (1996) in that the civil society argument should be understood 
as containing a paradox. Some aspects of the civil society argument can severely challenge 
authoritarians, as a vibrant civil society is assumed to imply that the population will become 
more capable of “energizing resistance to a tyrannical regime” (Foley and Edwards 1996: 39).  
However, other aspects of the civil society argument focus more on civil society’s 
contribution to good and effective governance, which this thesis has assumed is a goal for 
authoritarians as well. In Putnam’s words: “Strong society, strong economy; strong society, 
strong state” (Putnam, Leonardi et al. 1994: 176).  The paradox has consequences for how 
competitive authoritarian regimes choose to govern civil society, which in turn has 
implications for the object of interest in this thesis, namely the opportunity structures NGOs 
are provided with.  
Against this backdrop, I have explored the concept of closing civic space when 
coupled with the concept of limited pluralism. While some level of pluralism in civil society 
is necessary in order to cope with the institutional uncertainties that competitive authoritarian 
regimes by default suffer from, closing the space for civil society is equally called for in order 
to ensure the survival of a regime that is neither entirely democratic nor completely 
authoritarian.  It is exactly at this cross point that new opportunity structures arise and old 
ones come to an end for NGOs. This thesis therefore argues that these two concepts must be 
seen in relation to one another when assessing the true opportunity structures for NGOs in 
semi-authoritarian settings.  
6.3 Notes on limitations and suggestions for further research 
 Like any study, this thesis has limitations that should be accounted for when 
discussing what the study may say something about. First of all, the sample of NGOs that I 
have interviewed counts six. The sample is too narrow to be able to generalize the findings 
with a fair degree of certainty. The eleven respondents are all based in St Petersburg and 
Moscow and are in different ways working in the sphere of human rights. This implies that 
the findings may not coincide with how NGOs in smaller cities or NGOs working in different 
fields respond to restrictions. More research both on the Russian case and comparative 
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research on other competitive authoritarian regimes is therefore needed in order to investigate 
if the findings of this thesis can be verified elsewhere.  
The respondents interviewed in this thesis were for the most part employees working in 
predominately established NGOs. The findings indicate that some NGOs choose to adapt less 
formal ways of organizing themselves as a response to restrictions. Future research should 
therefore look at how these informal entities work. How do their goals and working methods 
differ from the NGOs that choose to remain organized more traditionally? Also of interest is 
how new civic initiatives are forming in a closing space environment – do they move directly 
into an informal way of organizing, and what tools can hybrid regimes use to intercept these 
before they reach potentially threatening levels? 
More research is also needed on the second phenomenon of interest to this thesis, limited 
pluralism. The growth of deliberative organs was in this thesis assumed to compensate for the 
lack of information that semi-authoritarian regimes experience, and empirical evidence 
suggested that alternative civic actors are heavily included. It is therefore reasonable to ask 
what function these alternative civic actors serve. How can the mix of alternative civic actors 
and more critical civic actors serve to depoliticize issues when brought together? 
To point back to the concerns raised in the methodological discussion, many of these 
questions will benefit from direct contact with sources in order to gain the best data material 
available in a semi-authoritarian setting. This thesis therefore encourages the use of fieldwork 
and qualitative interviews for further research. 
Particularly research on closing space for civil society is growing, and exciting times 
await both NGOs experiencing it as well as for those who follow the development on the 
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Main issues/ Who Foreign agent? 
1 n/a The Norwegian Helsinki Committee – Senior 
Advisor Inna Sangnadzhieva 
- 
2 n/a Loosely organized meeting place for 
activists.  
Have never been registered as a 
legal entity 
3 n/a Regional Office for the Ombudsman for 
human rights – Head of staff Olga 
Shtannikova 
- 
4 1 Rights of conscripts Formerly in the registry, succeeded 
in deregistering 
5 1 Rights of conscripts Formerly in the registry, succeeded 
in deregistering 
6 2 Freedom of speech/ information Yes, but reorganized as response. 
7 3 Rights of homeless people No 
8 3 Rights of homeless people No 
9 4 Against use of torture Yes, but reorganized as response. 
10 5 Against discrimination and misuse of anti-
extremism laws 
Yes 
11 6 Rights of migrants Yes 





Interview guide (NGOs) 
(Short introduction about the project. The respondent is reminded that participation is 
voluntary, and that they can withdraw their consent at any time) 
Introductory questions 
- Please describe the NGOs main goals. 
- How would you describe the support you have from ordinary Russians? 
- How do you work to spread your message to the public? 
Consultative mechanisms and control organs 
- How do you work to influence decisions?  
- Probe: Are you or anyone in your NGO involved with (or have been involved 
with): 
o The PCHRCS 
o The Civic Chambers 
o The ONK 
o Human Rights ombudsman 
o Public Councils for ministries 
o Or anything that resembles these bodies 
- Follow up if member: Describe your role there, why is it beneficial for you/ your 
NGO to participate? 
- Follow up if not member and if relevant: What is your impression of these bodies? 
- Do you/ your NGO have any friends or acquaintances in these bodies?  
- Do the authorities in other ways invite you to provide your opinions? 
Registration 
- How are you registered? 
- Have you changed/ are you considering changing your legal entity? 
Funding 
- How has the foreign agent law affected your financial situation? 
- What kind of Russian grants do you apply for? 





- What kind of international network do you have? 
- Has the foreign agent law affected the way you communicate with international 
partners? 
At the end 
- Do you feel that it is easy for you to predict what kind of reactions your activities 
will be met with? 
- Do you have any recommendations on people I should try to get an interview 
with? 
 
